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ABSTRACT 
The recent financial-crisis that Greece (Hellas) suffers has restricted and reduced the 
budgets of many organizations. Among those, the Hellenic ministry of defense has begun 
examining ways to reduce costs while maintaining operational readiness. Retirement 
legislation is the first area the Hellenic ministry of defense is examining. Variables such 
as years of service required to receive a pension, years of service by pay grade, and the 
skills officers should possess for promotion were examined and recorded in ordinances 
(directives) issued by the president of the Hellenic Republic.  
However, these ordinances are expected to expand the number of officers in the 
middle pay grades. In an attempt to deal with potential increases in middle and higher pay 
grades of officer inventory the Hellenic Ministry of Defense is examining an alternative 
plan of two parallel officer force structures: war and auxiliary. The primary structure will 
consist of war officers. These officers are considered top performers whose careers stop 
at the pay grade of flag officer. The auxiliary inventory includes those officers exhibiting 
lower performance with the terminal pay grade of captain. The purpose of these parallel 
paths is to ensure all officers serve 35 years in order to receive full pensions.  
This thesis analyzed job performance from the perspective of experience, ability, 
motivation, and accomplishment of advanced degrees. It concluded that experience 
should be combined with education level as a reliable evaluation field. Through the use 
of weighting priorities, the Hellenic navy should establish job performance as a single 
number, or officer ranking. Thus, top performers are distinguished from officers with 
lower performance on periodic evaluations. Using Markov-chain models and officer 
scores on job performance, the war and auxiliary inventories were examined. The war 
inventory was then adjusted to corresponding billets at every pay grade during a five-year 
period. The auxiliary officers were examined for future vacancies in the war inventory. 
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The recent financial crisis that Greece (Hellas) suffers from, has restricted and 
reduced the budgets of many organizations. Among these, the Hellenic Ministry of 
Defense (HMoD) has begun examining ways to reduce expenses. Retirement cost is the 
first variable under examination. In 1996, the presidency of the Hellenic Republic issued 
an ordinance (Presidency of the Hellenic Republic, Ordinance A, 219/1996) regarding the 
structural development of officer careers throughout the Hellenic armed forces’ 
pyramidal chain of command. Variables such as actual years of service required to 
receive a pension, time (minimum and maximum) in each pay grade, and skills officers 
should possess to be promoted were examined. These variables were identical for each of 
the three branches of the armed forces (army, navy, and air force).  
For many years, a pyramidal shape has represented the force-structure 
development of officer inventory for the Hellenic navy (HN). However, the increasing 
number of accessions at the Hellenic Naval Academy (HNA) since the middle of the 
1980s has caused an increase in officer inventory. Increases in accessions have caused 
serious problems in officer development at almost every pay grade. The worst problem 
appears in the middle pay grades, where the total numbers of officers has been over 
accessed.  
To address this increased inventory of midgrade officers, the ordinance 
establishes three years-of-service periods that an officer should reach in order to receive a 
pension. The first period is at sixteen years of service (including years in the military 
academies), at which retirees could get a minimum pension. The second period is at 25 
years of service, where an officer could get a moderate pension. Officers retiring after 35 
years of service would receive a full pension. Currently the Hellenic Military has no 
limits regarding age. Thus, a 43-year-old officer who entered the HNA at the age of 
eighteen could retire and get a moderate pension.   
 2 
To facilitate both the completion of years of service needed for a pension and the 
smooth flow of inventory (especially lieutenants [or O3s], lieutenant commanders [or 
O4s] and commanders [or O5s]), time in each pay grade were designated. In particular, 
thresholds for minimum and maximum years of service were established. As a result, the 
flow of officers at each pay grades was temporarily resolved and promotion procedures 
were implemented when officers completed the maximum required years of service in 
each pay grade.    
The ordinance includes a general description of promotion qualifications. Some 
qualifications are related to merits and skills required by the job. These skills are related 
to educational background, operational knowledge and experience, or personality traits 
and tendencies (such as persistence, perception, cooperation, etc.) and the last category 
included distinguished merits (e.g. ability in flight operations). In other words, certain 
levels of qualification provide the basis by which an officer possessing “X” skills and 
merits would be considered a top performer. 
Many organizations use some form of evaluation reports of personnel as a metric 
to measure an individual’s level of performance. The military emphasizes individual 
performance, which is included in the ordinance. The ordinance provides a general design 
of how to use fitness reports and explains the importance of these reports during selection 
for promotion. The ordinance does not include detailed instructions of how to fill out 
evaluations, and gives no specific criteria to secure any degree of objectivity. 
The ordinance was initially successful, but due to the financial crisis, doubt has 
risen. Like other organizations, the HMoD is striving to reduce costs while maintaining 
operational readiness. Retirement legislation is the first among many areas to be 
examined. Regardless of age, officers are obliged to serve for 35 years (Presidency of the 
Hellenic Republic, Ordinance A΄ 120/2010) in order to receive a full pension. If they 
retire earlier (essentially resigning) than 35 years of service, they have to wait until age 
60 to receive a pension. Furthermore, the pension they receive corresponds proportionally 
to their actual years of service. However, retirement legislation was not the only area 
examined. Required years of service in each pay grade were extended according to 
ordinance 167/A/2010. The outcome of the implementation of both new ordinances is 
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expected to expand the number of officers in the middle grades of the pyramid. In an 
attempt to deal with potentially greater inflation in the middle and higher pay grades, an 
alternative plan of two parallel officer inventories was proposed. The primary inventory 
will be war officers (very capable individuals who are considered top performers and 
whose career stops at flag-officer pay grades). The auxiliary inventory will include those 
officers with lower performance level and the terminal pay grade would be captain. The 
purpose of these parallel inventories is to ensure that all officer serving 35 years receive a 
full pension and avoid having to wait until age 60.  
After almost 15 years since the President of the Hellenic Republic issued the 
ordinance regarding career development in the HAF, much has changed. The financial 
crisis has caused an immediate effect in the way every organization operates and, most 
importantly, has decreased their budgets.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine policies in order to facilitate the 
implementation of two parallel inventories for HN deck officers. The examination 
includes criteria regarding promotion by pay grades in the war inventory and, transfer to 
the parallel auxiliary. The research examines how to keep the total number of officers in 
the war inventory steady and how to adjust the distribution of officers by pay grade to the 
corresponding war-billets across a five-year horizon. This work includes an analysis on 
how to minimize the inflation of officers (existing billets in each pay grade versus the 
current population of deck officers). The thesis analyzes individual performance from 
different perspectives, assigns numerical values and determines how individual 
performance could be used as the principal criteria for officer selection for future war and 
auxiliary inventories.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
• Which promotion criteria meet required officer accessions so that only top 
performers track to war officer inventory? 
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• Can components such as experience, ability (performance), motivation, and 
attainment of advanced degrees reliably convert performance into a metric 
with numerical values? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What practices should be adopted to turn fitness reports into an objective tool 
for promotion? 
• How can war and auxiliary inventories be estimated over five years?  
 D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study provides decision makers with alternatives when examining parallel 
officer war and auxiliary inventories. Using numerical values for individual performance, 
decision makers will be able to score, select and promote only the most capable officers 
in the war inventory. Additionally, less capable officers will be transferred to the 
auxiliary inventory. Furthermore, the population of HN deck officers learn details about 
what individual performance essentially is and how it can be measured. Thus, the study 
serves as a guide to examining officer performance and indicating areas in which officers 
should further develop their qualifications. An individual’s skill development contributes 
to the overall performance of the HN.  
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The scope of this thesis will include the following:  
Turning individual performances, expressed in words, into a numerical value, 
based on the primary components of experience, ability, motivation, and possession of 
advanced degrees (indicating level of education) and the secondary appropriate 
components of personality.  
 The establishment (based on numerical value of job performance) of the proper 
flow of officers (promotions), so that only top performers fill the existing war inventory 
billets. 
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F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research consists of the following elements:   
• A literature review of performance evaluation of textbooks and studies 
will be examined to the restated primary and secondary components and 
how these connect to the promotion, retention, and retirement rates of 
officers.  
• An examination of HN officer-inventory totals (number of officers in each 
rank) will be conducted. 
• A Markov-chain model is developed to compute the 
accessions/appropriate flow of officers needed to keep steady the number 
of war officers as a whole and to adjust their distribution in each pay grade 
to the corresponding billets, over a five-year period.  
• The results will be summarized and conclusions discussed, along with 
recommendations for potential future policies that should be considered 
beyond the next five years. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter II provides a literature review 
of the main and secondary components of individual performance based on previous 
studies and related textbooks. Job performance is converted into a range of numerical 
values. Chapter III describes and justify the structural mechanism used to compute the 
right accessions flow of officers within the war inventory of the HN. Addittionally, there 
is an analysis of the current distribution of officers in each pay grade and corresponding 
billets. Chapter IV incorporates the restated structural mechanism into the current sole 
chain of command so as to find the right measure of accessions flow of officers. Chapter 
V presents a summary of research, followed by conclusions and recommendations based 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO JOB PERFORMANCE 
Evaluating individual job performance within organizations is an extremely broad 
subject that can be approached from several directions. Essentially, it is related to human 
behavior in the performance of tasks, whether alone or as part of a team. Performance is 
inherently hard to measure. An organization is a living idea, because it is primarily based 
on a variety of people with different cultures and personalities who work together to 
achieve specific objectives and goals. McShane and Von Glinow write that every 
organization “differs in its cultural content; that is the relative ordering of values,”1 and 
thus, given the huge diversity of different internal rules and regulations, job designs and 
goals, it can be said that every organization is a unique entity. A variety of job-
performance measurements exist that align with organizational values. Based on the 
characteristics that separate civilian from military organizations, it is necessary to define 
job performance from a military perspective. In other words, though a number of 
definitions already exist, one must explore how a military’s unique culture, job design, 
rules, and goals shape job performance. 
Even though job performance shapes organizational attributes, it primarily resides 
within each individual’s unique character. Models have been developed concerning 
individual elements and attributes; they can be referred to as “drivers” that control an 
individual’s behavior. In military organizations, the attribute of experience, in terms of 
actual years of service or years of tenure, along with ability and a number of other 
characteristics of an individual’s personality, make up these drivers. They should always 
be adapted to the characteristics that differentiate civilian from military organizations, 
and play an important role on the level of job performance. However, special attention 
should be given to one of the most important personality traits—internal forces of 
motivation. All individuals direct their actions based on how motivated they are to 
achieve the goals they have set for themselves and the goals of the organization. 
Nevertheless, the goal’s magnitude determines the amount of effort that each individual 
is willing to perform to achieve it.  
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Another important factor that is crucial within military environments is level of 
education. Military organizations, through fully funded educational programs offered to 
officers, essentially make an investment that will benefit the organization in the long run, 
since return on investment cannot be measured in the short run. In particular, 
postgraduate studies at the Naval Postgraduate School are fully funded programs for deck 
officers and studies are expected to have a positive effect on each officer’s job 
performance in the long run. The expectations then move forward, yielding a positive 
effect on the organization’s overall performance.  
Defining individual performance for the military is a necessity, since it is often 
completely different from civilian organizations, due to its mission. “Destroy and kill 
enemies”2 is the reason the military exists. Thus, military and civilian personnel of the 
military should be aligned with that distinguished mission and direct all their knowledge, 
skills, and abilities to serving. However, effort is not enough. They need appropriate 
material in order to do their jobs efficiently.  
It is known that the environment in which a military operates varies depending on 
the nature of the operation. For the Hellenic navy, ships and services ashore are the main 
components that make up the operational environment.  
Finally, though individual performance is hard to measure, the restated elements 
will become the means to turn it from an abstract idea into a range of numerical values.  
Such an action is a necessity, especially when top performers from a pool of individuals 
or officers have to be selected and promoted.    
B. PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE FROM THE 
MILITARY  PERSPECTIVE.  
Job performance is simultaneously an abstract concept that one can approach 
from a number of directions and the most significant criterion affecting the overall 
success of an organization. Job performance is influenced by an organization’s culture 
and operational framework. Civilian and military organizations differ significantly 
because of the primary mission that each one serves, along with a number of other 
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characteristics. These characteristics essentially set the job design of military 
organizations that frames organizational demands and measurements of job performance.  
1. Basic Characteristics of Civilian Organizations 
An organization is a living idea with human capital as its base that strives to earn 
a living for itself and attain its goals. A civil organization, or firm, or company, directs its 
hierarchical structure, traits, attitudes, behavioral doctrine, and frame of regulations in 
order to make the highest profit possible. These elements, along with discipline and 
employee personalities, create an organization’s unique culture. That culture has a 
considerable impact on the workforce; moreover, it obliges workers indirectly to exhibit 
their highest possible level of individual performance so the company can achieve its 
goals (e.g., highest possible profit). Furthermore, technology is an integral part of civilian 
organizations. An advanced technology may replace workers if managers decide doing so 
is cost effective. The graphic of “Figure 1”3 illustrates how a combination of workers 
(labor hours) and technology (capital) can be combined so as to minimize cost and 
maximize profits. 
 
Figure 1.   Cost minimization in production of profit-maximizing output (From 3) 
Isoquant Q’ represents the profit-maximizing output. Lines K1L1, K2L2, K3L3, 
represent the total cost of the different combinations of labor hours (workers) and 
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(technology). Ehrenberg and Smith use this graphic to show that the tangent line of K2L2 
to curve Q’ gives the appropriate combination of humans/capital (Lm, Km) that minimizes 
costs. Therefore, in the free market that dominates world commerce, civilian 
organizations have two basic characteristics: 
• They strive with each other to attract high quality and very capable workers 
(top performers). 
• They replace humans with capital, and the reverse, any time they wish, in 
order to achieve their goal of highest possible profit. 
2. Basic Characteristics of Military Organizations 
Using the United States Military (USM), the National Research Council (NRC) 
sees such differences between military and corporate organizations in issues such as 
structure, downsizing, leadership, and inter-organizational cooperation. The NRC lists a 
number of characteristics within military organizations that do not appear in corporate 
organizations and underlines two points worth mentioning.  
First, these differences are well known to those in the military, who live 
with them and their consequences. They are not usually articulated, so that 
these different features may routinely pass unnoticed by those not familiar 
with the military organization on a day-to-day basis. Second, the point is 
not merely that the military is subject to congressional rules. All 
organizations are subject to such structures. Fair labor practices, 
requirements of the Occupational safety and Health Administration, rules 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, civil and criminal law, the 
Internal Revenue Code, and antitrust legislation, to name just a few, 
represent some of the legal regulations that define and constrain all 
organizations. It is the particular nature of the rules governing the military 
that makes its organizational operation so different.2  
The points that follow describe thirteen characteristics of the restated military list 
and how they are related to the organization of the HN. 
a. Military’s Distinct Mission 
“First and foremost is the military’s distinct mission. The military is the 
only organization with the mission to destroy and kill enemies of the nation. Neither 
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police nor police-like organizations, are authorized to kill in this manner.”2 In other 
words, the military is allowed to make use of deadly force either in an aggressive or 
defensive manner so as to protect its nation’s interests from threats. There is no one other 
organization that operates in the same manner. As with the USM, officers of the HN, 
given the power that arises from deadly force aboard ships, have to support and 
accomplish the mission of the HN, which is the following:  
Under the change of the dogma concerning the integrated defense of the 
areas of Greece and Cyprus in 1997, the navy aims to develop its power 
and domination into this strategically important area of the southeast 
Mediterranean. Its goals are to protect the Hellenic rights and border 
integrity, protect commercial sea-lines, and protect as well as cultivate a 
spirit of security to the Hellenic population of the Greek islands. 
Furthermore, it has the role of the transporter of supplies for the rest of the 
units of the armed forces and contributes mainly through Air transport to 
servicing the health needs of the population of the islands. Finally, the 
presence of the navy in the islands and especially in those of the eastern 
Aegean sea and the area of Corfu is constant. Hellenic Navy ships carry 
out patrolling missions in order to deal with any possible external threats 
and provide support to the Hellenic coast guard in central issues such as 
preventing illegal immigration, drug smuggling etc.4 
b. Standard Budget 
To “raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use 
shall be for a longer Term than two Years”5 is what the U.S Constitution clearly defines, 
and the congress approves on a year by year basis, as the budget available for the 
military. Similarly, the Hellenic parliament decides the size of the Hellenic armed force’s 
budget (including that of the HN) in each fiscal year. When the budget is approved, it 
remains fixed throughout the current fiscal year (an exception exists whenever the 
government decides to acquire major equipment in either the sort or the long run). The 
fixed budget restrains the HN from planning operational activities beyond the current 
year. It also has a strong impact on the number of each year’s accessions, since they have 
to be fully aligned with the budget.  
Furthermore, each individual has to demonstrate high levels of 
performance so as to accomplish the rapidly increasing number of tasks at the present 
time. National exercises that maintain high operational readiness, routine missions, 
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participation in worldwide taskforces against terrorism, and an additional number of 
subsequent tasks are complex parts of a deployment puzzle that every individual in the 
HN has to deal with and successfully accomplish. However, the accomplishment of these 
tasks must also be efficient. In other words, HN personnel should do their best to 
maintain and support the means through which naval operations are implemented, with 
minimal costs and sources.  
Another human performance incentive is pay. In periods of limited 
budgets, unfortunately, the ability of decision makers to increase salaries and bonuses of 
personnel is minimal. On the contrary, the best option in this case is to maintain salaries 
at their current levels, while the worse scenario is to decrease them. These elements are 
compounded in todays Hellas, due to the financial crisis. The government, due to its 
commitments to the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, has already 
downsized the budget in every public organization. The magnitude of downsizing in the 
HAF budget from 2009, when the first signs of the crisis appeared, to 2012, in billions of 
Euros as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Budget of Hellenic Armed Forces (From 6) 
Personnel payments have suffered a decline of 23.70% (from 2009 to 2012), whereas 
maintenance and supply expenditures have declined 40.99%. Nevertheless, today’s 
personnel within the HAF are doing the same jobs as they did before the start of the 
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crisis. Even worse, they are facing an increasingly demanding environment of threats and 
global peace in general. 
c. Sets of Personnel   
Another similarity with the USM is the separate sets of personnel that 
comprise the workforce of the HN. Though active-duty service members are the majority, 
there are a significant number of civilian employees who hold key positions. This is 
especially true within the ministry of defense. They possess the power, by law, to decide 
a wide spectrum of issues such as personnel payments, maintenance and supply 
expenditures and acquisition of major components. The NRC notes that civilian 
personnel are “managed differently, evaluated differently, often held to different 
performance standards, and differ from each other in a number of other ways.”2 One of 
those ways, which is extremely important, is that they have the power to preserve and 
defend their interests under the coverage of labor unions. Taylor, Arango, and Lockwood 
write, “The union is specifically empowered to collectively represent its members as a 
bargaining agent to secure benefits in excess of what the government is willing to offer.”7 
This definition shows the power that civilian personnel possess within military 
environments. Thus, officers, especially those of high rank (for whom military rules 
dominate their entire life), should have the ability to capture the social trends coming 
from civilian personnel within the HN and then manage them in an appropriate manner. 
Superior officers should promote effective team building among subordinates with 
different rules, perceptions, interests, social trends and principles.  
d. Rank Structure 
HN deck officers have a specific, pyramidal rank structure. Its main 
purpose is to facilitate, “the execution of orders through each echelon in the chain of 
command, insuring personal control at each step and final action only by the commander 
immediately responsible.”8 The only source of HN deck officers are graduates of the 
Hellenic Naval Academy.  
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Upon graduating, a deck officer starts his career as an ensign, which corresponds to an 
O1 officer of the USM, and may retire as vice admiral, or O9. HN pay grades and their 
correspondence to USM officer ranks are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1.   Hellenic navy pay grades 
   
Ensign or O1 Lieutenant Junior or O2 Lieutenant or O3 
   
LT Commander or O4 Commander or O5 Captain or O6 
   




 Admiral  
 
The billets in each layer of the pyramid are fixed by federal law. Thus, the 
HN cannot change its requirements on a short-term basis so as to increase or abolish 
billets to facilitate successful execution of its missions. This results in a certain number of 
officers who have to accomplish successfully every mission or task they undertake, no 
matter the mission. There is one option, under conditions of long-lasting heavy workload, 
the Navy can ask for increased accessions. However, such a request requires 
parliamentary approval. Furthermore, increased accessions will not result an immediate 
increase in experienced and knowledgeable officers in the short run. It is worth 
mentioning that the whole organization is built upon the middle layers of the pyramid. 
That happens because middle-layer officers are between thirty and forty-five years old, 
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which means that they are simultaneously experienced and relatively young, and thus the 
most productive individuals within the organization. Deck officers must demonstrate high 
productivity in a short time to accomplish today’s increasing numbers of missions and 
tasks. 
e. Pay Structure 
Rank and pay structures are equally important and fixed. Each individual 
in the organization brings unique traits, which include culture, personality, perceptual 
capability, etc. Additionally, some individuals are more productive than others. 
Unfortunately, the difference of productivity among officers is a shortcoming of a fixed-
pay structure since those who exhibit high levels of production do not get paid 
proportionally, nor do they receive bonuses. Their merit is also not, nonmonetary, 
compensated (awards or metals) but rather HN distributes insignia and metals based on 
standard criteria that, most likely, the majority of officers do possess. Thus, given the 
absence of bonuses and the equal distribution of metals across the majority of officers, 
few factors are in place to motivate officers to work productively.  
f. Early Promotions 
Early promotion is a procedure that exists in the USM and acts as an 
incentive. The HN does not use early promotions; rather, ordinance 167/A/2010, issued 
by the presidency in 2010, defines the fixed length of time that each officer, from O1 to 
O6, has to spend in each pay grade. Therefore, no other potential incentives to motivate 
officers exists. 
g. Retirement Schemes 
Military retirement schemes differ among nations. In the United States, the 
minimum time required to get a pension is twenty years. If a uniformed individual 
decides to leave the military before that length of time, he gets no retirement pay. In 2010 
the Hellenic parliament approved many tough measures for the public sector, among 
which is a new retirement scheme for the HN. This scheme demands thirty-five years of 
actual service for a uniformed individual to qualify for a pension. Earlier separation from 
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the military means he will receive no pension until the age of sixty. Prior to 2010, some 
military personnel could retire after sixteen years of service (especially those in the 
helicopter, underwater demolition, and submarine communities), and deck officers after 
twenty-five years of service, and receive retirement pay.  
Such a change, even though it was inevitable for the entire public sector, 
had a significant impact on both the uniformed personnel of the HAF and those 
individuals who were considering reenlistment. The military environment is risky by 
nature, and an earlier retirement plan attracted very capable individuals. Its abolishment 
has two potential outcomes. Firstly, it might negatively affect the number of high quality 
recruits. Second, military personnel whose “goal contests are associated with differing 
degrees of need satisfaction”9 and have a need satisfaction (an element that contributes to 
motivation) that includes early separation and retirement pay, might be disappointed and, 
as a consequence, exhibit low levels of productivity and performance. Essentially, the 
new retirement system might affect motivation in the long run.  
h. Military: Greedy Institutions   
“Military organizations are ‘greedy institutions’ because they require a lot 
from their personnel: during active duty, personnel are on a permanent, 24-hour call with 
rather idiosyncratic working shifts.”10 Shattuck (NPS professor, 2011), states that, 
“concerning the Navy, even though the Navy standard workweek reflects a desired 
standard, it does not reflect what is actually being done at sea times.” 11  
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Figure 3.   At sea Navy standard workweek (From 11) 
In other words, there are more working hours a week than Figure 3 
reflects. Furthermore, military personnel can be deployed in remote areas for extended 
periods of time with short notice. Finally, Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull write about 
military personnel that “their leave might be a subject to cancellation (Druckman et al., 
1997).”10 In any case, military personnel cannot decline a deployment or avoid the 
circadian rhythms of assignments. Furthermore, they do not receive extra compensation 
when working more than the normal working hours.  
HN does not differ from other military organizations and their policies 
requiring 24-hour call and circadian rhythms of assignments. HN ships, a few operational 
ground stations, and many other services are aligned with these working conditions 
which represent a portion of the overall HN culture. As McShane and Von Glinow write, 
“strong culture increases organizational performance only when the cultural content is 
appropriate for the organization’s environment.”1 
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i. Fixed Working Conditions 
Military personnel cannot bargain for working conditions when it comes 
to infrastructure. The human–systems integration (HSI) concept includes actions taken in 
the early stages of projects and systems acquisition (e.g., acquisition of ships, platforms, 
ground facilities) that satisfy customer needs throughout the system’s lifecycle. HSI 
influences the actions and behavior of all participants (designers, customers, users, 
repairmen,) who are engaged in the system. Domains that play an important role in HSI 
are manpower, personnel, training, safety, occupational health, survivability, and 
habitability, in which individuals are at the core. Working conditions are discussed in this 
process not only to embrace the domains mentioned above, but also to secure their 
appropriateness. They are approved by the ministry of defense (if their cost does not 
exceed the budget available for the project) and implemented during system construction. 
At that point, nothing can change. Essentially, both military and civilian personnel who 
work with such an infrastructure are obliged to do their best, given the existing 
conditions. 
There is a potential of course, in the case of inappropriate working 
conditions, to ask and achieve small improvements, but that takes much time and is 
achieved through difficult bureaucratic procedures and budgeting constraints. These 
standards obligate HN officers to exhibit high levels of performance under specific 
working conditions without being asked for input prior to acquisition and sunsequently 
have no authority to invoke change. Striking, one of the rights that workers have, not only 
in civilian organizations but also in the public sector, is an unknown word in the 
vocabulary of military organizations around the globe.  
j. Discharges 
Unlike civilian organizations, the military cannot easily discharge poor 
uniformed performers, due to obligated service and return on investment. Unproductive 
civilian worker discharge is difficult because of the tough bureaucratic personnel 
procedures that need to be followed and the labor unions, within military environments, 
who protect and complicate the situation. Stites, (USN Captain), writes of labor unions: 
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“in democratic societies, the protection of individual rights is the cornerstone of 
government. Each institution/union in the society must protect individual rights to the 
maximum extent possible.”12  
Implications appear in cases like these that are closely related to the job 
performance of uniformed personnel and, especially, team leaders. Dew, (NPS professor , 
2011), states that “people that surround the star worker are those who implement the 
ideas and make the difference, after all.” Star workers are those individuals who are very 
capable/top performers or those with advanced education. The people who surround the 
star worker are the group of assistants who represent the team. Thus, if those uniformed 
or civilian personnel surrounding the star worker are poor performers and cannot be 
easily discharged, the team will not likely exhibit high productivity.  
The immediate outcome of a team’s poor performance has a strong effect 
on the leader, even though he might be a very capable person. Therefore, when an officer 
has been assigned to lead a team whose nonfunctional members cannot easily be 
discharged, he needs to be simultaneously an extremely high performer and an effective 
leader so as to lead his team to success even when the roster lacks capable personnel. 
k. Multi-Cultural Organizations 
The HAF consists of a large number of sub-organizations, including the 
three major branches—Army, Navy and Air force—as shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.   Structure of the Hellenic Armed Forces 
As the NRC states of the USM, “each one of the branches strives to maximize its own 
role in the larger organization.”2 This is true in the HAF as well.  Furthermore, each 
branch has its own philosophy and concepts about war operations. Thus, despite the 
fundamental differences and cultures that separate the sub-organizations, today’s 
complex war operations force them to cooperate so as to achieve their goals. In other 
words, as Jackson and Holvino write, “in a multicultural organization, conflict-
management skills need to include synergistic problem solving, value clarification, 
consensus building, and other collaborative strategies for managing differences.”13 Their 
words reflect why officers with different cultures (even in the HN) should be flexible and 
possess a high level of communication and interaction skills. These are indeed very 
significant elements of job performance and effective cooperation.  
l. Placements 
Decision makers in military organizations usually place officers in billets 
whose job descriptions fit their skills. Extended placements like these occur in the middle 
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pay grades where officers have specific skills and are simultaneously experienced and 
relatively young, and therefore constitute the most productive part of the military 
workforce. However, due to the huge diversity of skills, middle-pay-grade officers might 
be effective in middle-pay-grade billets, but not all of them are qualified to be promoted 
as top-rank officers and, thus, superior leaders. The highest layers of the pay-grade 
pyramid call for a combination of effective leadership and advanced job performance. 
Promotion boards are responsible to separate extremely capable officers, who possess the 
skills to become top-rank officers, from average ones.  
m. History, Traditions     
The characteristic that clearly separates the HN from other organizations is 
its own distinguished history/traditions. Two prominent examples illuminate the bright 
route that the navy has followed throughout the centuries. 
(1) Naval Battle of Salamis, 480 BC. The famous sea battle of 
Salamis took place in the straits of Salamis Island on the 22nd of September, 480 B.C. 
An alliance of Greek city-states that owned a fleet of 366 ships, commanded by an 
extremely capable leader named Themistokles (a famous politician and general), 
destroyed the fleet of the Persian Empire, consisting of 1207 ships. That defeat forced 
Xerxes and his troops to retreat once and for all. This sea battle is actually a milestone of 
ancient history, since it is believed that a Persian victory would have ended the 
development of both ancient Greece and Western Civilization. Strauss writes of the 
Battle of Salamis: “The world had never seen a battle like it. A channel only a mile wide 
held the fighting men of the three continents of the Old World: Africa, Asia and 
Europe.”14 He declares the battle as the milestone in the salvation of Greece and Western 
Civilization.  
(2) HS Adrias, 1943. The second example took place in October 
1943, when the escort destroyer Adrias survived a mine explosion in the Aegean Sea 
because of remarkable damage-control efforts.  
Commander Ioannis N. Toumbas grounded the ship in shallow waters off 
the Turkish coast so as to repair it to the extent possible. He later pulled 
the Adrias off in order to seek shelter in a more secluded cove. A month 
 22 
later, Adrias sailed stern-first under escort from three British motor 
gunboats to Limassol, Cyprus, and then on to Alexandria. It was too badly 
damaged to be worth repair, but the crew was saved and the RHN 
demonstrated its bravery and seamanship.15 
 
Figure 5.   Escort destroyer Adrias sailing back to Alexandria 
These examples reflect how high-quality personnel under strong leadership can 
accomplish the impossible. The sea battle of Salamis and the trip of the seriously 
damaged Adrias back to Alexandria signal that strong personality traits, principles, and 
beliefs should always be the guide in selecting officers to achieve the goals of the HN as 
an organization. That has a special meaning nowadays, when Hellas suffers an 
unprecedented financial crisis that significantly reduces available resources. In other 
words, officers should exceed their potentials by exhibiting advanced levels of 
performance to maintain the high HN standards of history and tradition.  
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3. Job-Design Theories and Dimensions Applied to Military 
Organizations 
An analysis of the characteristics that clearly separate military from civilian 
organizations leads to those theories of job design that best fits military concepts. Potter 
presents an analysis of job design that builds on assumptions and approaches in social 
science, including the dimensions of ontology, epistemology, and human nature. 
a. Ontological Dimensions 
Within the ontological dimension are two opposite trends concerning the 
explanation of job design. The first comes from the interpretivist point of view, defining 
job design “as being real only in the mind of the participant. In other words, job design is 
understood from the way that the worker has come to know his job. The design of the job 
is constructed through the participant’s perspective.”16 The second trend traces back to 
the functionalist perspective, which sees “job design as the set of written descriptions of 
actions, methods and techniques that compose the requirements of a particular job.”16  
b. Epistemological Dimensions 
Within epistemology, again, interpretivists say that the “participant has 
come to know his or her job through their own unique experiences”16 whereas a 
functionalist assumes that “job design can be known and understood removed from the 
individual. For example, the knowledge can be transferred in complete form from one 
person to another person through the use of written procedures.”16  
c. Human-Nature Dimension  
Within the dimension of human nature, the voluntaristic and deterministic 
trends approach job design from opposite directions. However, their approaches are 
somewhat difficult to imagine. Job design, from the organization’s perspective, 
designates how individuals “should go about accomplishing their tasks, which implies the 
worker is constrained by the job design.”16. A “voluntaristic view suggests that 
individuals are free to act in whatever way they wish in any situation”16, whereas a 
“deterministic view holds that people are constrained by the social situations of everyday 
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life and thus are not free to act.”16 Indeed, military personnel hold a distinguished place 
in society, they are identified by their uniforms, anyone can recognize them and, thus, 
they are obliged in every moment of their lives to set a good example of military 
personnel. They therefore operate in a deterministic environment within the society.  
The trend of functionalists in the ontological dimension views “job design 
as the set of written descriptions of actions, methods and techniques that compose the 
requirements of a particular job.”16 In the epistemological dimension, “knowledge can be 
transferred in complete form from one person to another person through the use of 
written procedures.”16 In the deterministic view of human nature, “people are constrained 
by the social situations of everyday life and thus are not free to act.”16 This describes job 
design from the military’s point of view, which sets the frame of regulations and actions 
of all uniformed individuals. 
4. Defining Job Performance within Military Organization. 
As stated, there are a number of definitions of job performance. Without defining 
the nature of an organization, Campbell describes job performance from a psychological 
perspective as an individual-level variable. In other words, individual performance is 
simply the frame of behavior under which men perform tasks. Campbell also points out 
that performance can take the form of a mentally unobservable ability. Decision making 
reflects that mental ability. Further developing these definitions, Mathis and Jackson 
present their findings about what constitutes a good individual (job) performance within 
the sector of human-resource management. Elements such as quantity and quality of 
work that are related to the meanings of effectiveness and efficiency, compatibility with 
others, which essentially leads to good communication skills, presence at work (including 
the personality and appearance each individual sends out at work—they both play a very 
important role within military organizations), length of service (which can expand 
experience) and, finally, flexibility in terms of figuring out ways to maximize profits, all 
constitute a set of factors that explain an advanced level of performance. Mathis and 
Jackson analyze “what constitutes good job performance on a job.”19 These elements are 
presented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Job performance (After 19) 
However, given the nature and constraints that flow from the characteristics and 
distinguished job design of military environments, job performance within military 
environments is a flexible behavior that uniformed individuals should employ against any 
enemy that threatens the nation’s interests. Their behavior may be either aggressive or 
defensive, depending on the nature of the threat. Moreover, uniformed individuals should 
be willing to expose their lives to danger whenever the nation’s interests so demand.    
Job performance is the most significant criterion that defines the overall success 
of an organization. A number of definitions point out that job performance is an 
individual-level variable, from a psychological perspective, and a mental, unobservable 
ability (such as precise decision making). The same words are used to express the ability 
of personnel to accomplish tasks in both civilian, profit making, and military, nonprofit 
organizations. However, military organizations across the globe, including the HN, differ 
from their civilian counterparts due to a number of specific characteristics. Their unique 
mission to kill and destroy enemies, their fixed budget and resources, the mixed set of 
personnel (uniformed and non-uniformed) that characterize the workforce, the fixed rank 
and pay structures, the lack of early promotions to indicate high performance (for the 
HN), fixed retirement schemes, working hours that exceed normal patterns, fixed 
working conditions concerning infrastructure, barriers to discharging uniformed and 
civilian poor performers, the existence of multiple sub-organizations/branches, specific 
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placement patterns and, finally, a distinguished history and long traditions frame the 
military’s unique job design and create an overall culture which states that “military 
organization with its ‘top to bottom’ control, is viewed as anti-individualistic and in 
conflict with basic democratic principles.”12 Figure 7 graphically presents those 
characteristics. Nevertheless, despite a number of constraints within military 
organizations, their uniformed and civilian personnel should accomplish tasks simply 
because “when a democratic state experiences a threat to its primary vital interest, 
survival, the military institution is accepted as necessary to insure state preservation.”12  
To achieve that goal, high-quality personnel must be included in the workforce of 
any military organization. Job performance dictates that these personnel exhibit flexible 
behavior and readiness to put their lives in danger whenever the nation demands. 
 
Figure 7.   Specific characteristics of Military Organizations 
 27 
C. DEFINING JOB PERFORMANCE FROM THE HUMAN PERSPECTIVE  
Given the specific characteristics that separate military organizations from 
civilian, military job performance has been defined as that behavior which military 
personnel should employ to achieve the goals of the organization. Beyond what the 
military desires, job performance should also be analyzed from the individual’s 
perspective. All definitions present job performance as a behavior and, therefore, human 
traits such as experience and abilities shape each individual’s behavior in both the 
working environment and his life.    
Mitchell, based on the literature of Porter and Lawler, (1968) and Campbell and 
Pritchard (1976), writes:  
Performance is caused by at least four and maybe more factors. In order to 
do well, one must know what is required (role expectations/perceptions), 
have the ability to do what is required, be motivated, and work in an 
environment in which intended actions can be translated into behavior.20 
These factors shape the MARS (motivation, abilities, role perceptions, and 
situational factors) model, as shown in Figure 8. However, motivation may be irrelevant 
to job performance in the MARS model. An example is when ability dominates 
motivation. Intellectual desire to achieve high scores at school may be more important 
than the obligation to study for many hours. Dunnette (January 1973) notes that “ability 
differences still are empirically the most important determiners of differences in job 
performance”21 and adds that “the degree of departure of job performance variance from 
what would be predicted by ability differences may provide clues about the degree of 
involvement of motivational variables.”21  
The specific characteristics of military organizations call for motivation and 
ability to be complements and not substitutes, because they both play a significant role in 
the successful accomplishment of tasks and goals. Another example in military 
environments is when technological means control the successful accomplishment of 
tasks, regardless of the level of an officer’s performance. In present times, advanced 
technology informs the armed forces, reducing the amount of effort an officer puts into 
achieving a task. Thus, if the successful accomplishment of a task depends mainly on 
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technology, the exertion an officer contributes is probably irrelevant to the overall 
performance of the system–officer technological means. However, the military’s 
distinguished mission and the power that comes from advanced technology dictates 
technology’s wise use. Therefore, officers’ job performances should be built on strong 
personalities.   
 
Figure 8.   The MARS model 
Consequently, the MARS model may be modified twice. The added human trait 
of experience and the traits of ability and motivation (which are already integral parts of 
the model) may initially reshape the model. Personality makes up the model’s final 
shape. These modifications are due to human traits that illustrate significant aspects of 
human behavior.  
1. Experience   
Experience can be approached from different directions. Given the 
standardization of an officer’s training, “physical” experience is one of these aspects 
which best fit the military environment. Popper and Eccles write, “Physical experience 
occurs whenever an object or environment changes.”22 In other words, an individual 
acquires physical experience when he observes various situations throughout an extended 
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period. Dewey adds, “We live from birth to death in a world of persons and things which 
in large measure is what it is because of what has been done and transmitted from 
previous human activities.”23 That is, a number of events in the real world shape an 
individual’s experience. The world changes every day and generates the continuity of 
experience, and experience functions as feedback. Given the successive events of 
previous situations and their results, individuals can modify the quality of their actions in 
future situations, based on transactions that occur between persons in the environment. 
People, objects and events comprise the environment. Furthermore, Dewey says that 
environment is any condition that interacts with an individual’s needs, purposes and 
goals. However, experience can broaden one’s mind or narrow it. According to de 
Nicolas,  
…as an individual passes from one situation to another, his world, his 
environment, expands or contracts. He does not find himself living in 
another world, but in a different part or aspect of one and the same world. 
What he has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one situation 
becomes an instrument of understanding and dealing effectively with the 
situation which follow. The process goes on as long as life and learning 
continue.24 
The author, in this case, imports the meaning of learning, which makes experience 
a useful tool. Learning, in terms of education, acts as a complement to experience, and 
not a substitute. Thus, experience should be analyzed under two conditions. The first 
condition is the existence of experience itself. The second condition is interaction 
between experience and education. 
a. Experience without Education 
In the absence of education, it is likely that experience narrows the range 
of human minds. This is natural. Individuals base their actions on old theories they know 
and find themselves reluctant to implement new ones. Without implementing the new 
ideas that education offers, individuals establish obstacles to their experience’s further 
growth. Especially for those who possess key positions within an organization, it is likely 
that they will prevent educated individuals who willing to put in extra effort from 
implementing new ideas that benefit the organization. “Experienced” people know how 
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the system “works,” they have dealt with a number of events in the past and, thus, they 
too often consider new ideas excessive luxuries. These are the old-fashioned minds that 
are afraid of potential changes. Many of them can be met within military environments. 
Let’s not forget that military organizations do not have competitors, and 
they do not care about new ideas and processes related to profit making. Thus, narrow-
minded people do not undertake responsibilities equivalent to the magnitude of their key 
positions, and they try to defend their own obsolete ideas. Finally, they care most about 
themselves and their interests rather than the overall progress of the organization for 
which they work.  
b. Experience Combined with Education 
On the other hand, education helps individuals to be opened minded. 
Dewey “interprets education as the scientific method by means of which man studies the 
world, acquires cumulatively knowledge of meanings and values, these outcomes, 
however, being data for critical study and intelligent living.”23 These ideas promote an 
individual’s experience in the form of “intelligent living”. Therefore, people become 
more flexible. They approach situations from different directions and distinguish their 
roles and set priorities in order to successfully achieve their goals and the goals of the 
organization.  These people are needed in the military environment in order to implement 
new ideas, successful or not. Even though the military does not seek profits, in terms of 
money, its distinct mission demands the acceptance and implementation of new ideas that 
will lead to a competitive advantage over the capabilities of a potential enemy. 
Experience is a crucial factor that may determine positively or negatively the 
overall outcome of an action in any situation. It is likely that neither experience nor 
education can stand by itself. Of course, many other characteristics play an important role 
in how individuals interact with the environment in which they live. However, the 
appropriate combination of experience and education helps an individual to achieve 
“intelligent living.” Military organizations need their personnel (especially their officers, 
who are the future leaders) to possess both experience and a certain level of education. 
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Only then can officers be opened minded and accept and implement new ideas. That is 
the way to secure a competitive advantage over an enemy’s capabilities.  
2. Abilities 
According to McShane and Von Glinow, ability is one of the “four factors which 
directly influence voluntarily individual behavior and performance.”1 It is the correlation 
between ability and performance that leads every organization, civilian or military, to 
seek capable people. Besides, advanced ability helps employees to achieve their goals 
efficiently.  
Nicholls describes two different conceptions of ability. Their common notion is 
that effort and learning help improve task mastery. Furthermore, once task mastery has 
been developed, it is not normally lost. In other words, Nicholls claims that ability is 
divided into natural talents that allow individuals to learn the material they need to 
successfully accomplish their goals. He concludes that learning is subject to time (effort) 
and learned capabilities (educational background, skills). 
a. First Conception of Ability 
The first conception combines a task’s level of difficulty and each 
individual’s self-judgment about his ability. These elements help individuals realize their 
perceived mastery and level of knowledge. An example of the first conception is when 
individuals feel they have learned the necessary material well. They become 
automatically more competent and they consider a task difficult only when they believe 
they will fail. Thus, concerning self-confidence, the more difficult the task, the higher the 
level of ability a potential success denotes.  
b. Second Conception of Ability 
 The second conception correlates ability with capacity. In this case, time 
is the dependent variable. The less time someone needs to learn the material (compared to 
another person), the higher capacity he possesses, and vice versa.  
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Given the two conceptions, ability is divided into three components: 
general ability (or general intelligence), perceptual speed, and psychomotor ability. 
Ackerman writes of general ability that it “represents a broad construct that underlies 
nonspecific information.” 26 General ability corresponds to the first conception. Ackerman 
considers the main concept in perceptual speed ability to be the speed of consistent 
encoding and symbol comparison—that is, how fast one creates memory codes for a 
word, or an object, or anything else, in order to remember it. Finally, he says 
psychomotor ability represents individual differences concerning the speed and accuracy 
of responses, with little or no cognitive-processing demands. In other words, he 
underlines the importance of human response when specific knowledge is not needed. 
Perceptual speed and psychomotor ability correspond to the second conception, and all 
three components are related to individual performance, as explained below. 
Whenever there is a task to be accomplished, a few instructions and 
procedures have to be established. There are three phases concerning the skill-acquisition 
needed to accomplish a task (these skills relate to learning the instructions and procedures 
of the task). Each one of these phases corresponds to the three components. Phase one 
corresponds to general ability, phase two corresponds to perceptual-speed ability and 
phase three corresponds to psychomotor ability. The three panels that include the three 
phases on the “x” axis and the performance level on the “y” axis, indicating the ability 
function of each component are shown in Figure 9. 
The top panel shows that general ability, the phase encompassing the 
establishment of instructions and procedures of a task (which are almost unknown and 
tests the individual’s perceived mastery and knowledge) will help an individual to 
perform well enough while acquiring needed skills (learning instructions/procedures). 
The panel in the middle refers to a situation where the establishment of the 
instructions/procedures is set. One who possesses perceptual-speed ability (phase two) 
will adapt the instructions/procedures to the task in a short time (adaptation also implies 
acquisition of skills). Thus, this person will exhibit high levels of performance (Phase 
two is in line with the top of the bell curve). Finally, the bottom panel illustrates phase 
three.  
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Individuals who have been engaged with and practiced a task long enough do not need 
speed ability anymore. Therefore, based on psychomotor ability, they exhibit a lower 
level of performance.  
 
Figure 9.   Performance-vs.-ability function (From 26) 
In phase three, we observe a minor difference of performance levels (between panels two 
and three). That means the differences between fast and slow learners are small in this 
particular phase.  
Ability is a human factor that reflects the natural talents and capabilities within an 
individual in learning, as quickly as possible, what is needed to accomplish tasks. Serious 
attention to ability should be paid within military environments. High-pay grades demand 
officers who should be able to make serious decisions (even concerning the lives of their 
subordinates). Thus, given the knowledge they should have for each task, they must 
possess both general and perceptual speed ability in order to take an initial action as the 
task begins. Then, having understood how the situation progressed, they have to make 
other right decisions in almost no time.  
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Both these deeds are indicators of high levels of performance. Therefore, higher 
standards of ability should be paramount while an officer climbs up the chain of 
command.    
The analysis of experience and ability suggests a modified MARS model, as 
shown in Figure. The reformed model shows the interaction of experience with the 
elements of role perception, ability (as an integral part of behavior) and situational 
factors. Overall, the new model reflects the meaning of experience. There are additional 
reasons for the close relationship of experience with the other factors of the reformed 
model. 
• Experience is very important for role perception. If combined with education, 
it can help individuals to understand clearly the assigned task, set priorities, 
and designate the appropriate behavior to achieve goals. Thus, they perceive 
their roles in such a way as to benefit the organization. If not combined with 
education, they will most likely perceive their role from their own point of 
view, in any situation. In other words, they will take the set of actions that 
benefits only themselves. 
• McShane and Von Glinow define ability as “the natural aptitudes and learned 
capabilities required to successfully complete a task.”1 Therefore, the 
combination of experience, which upgrades the natural aptitude of capturing 
images/events quickly, and education (the outcome of learning capabilities) 
perfectly match this definition. 
• Situational factors are those that change frequently. An example would be the 
roster of personnel in a job or the available budget. Especially for military 
organizations, the working environment changes frequently due to transfers 
and principles under which every commander wants personnel to work. 
Unlike those who possess only experience, individuals with both experience 
and education are more likely to perform in a way that will benefit the entire 
organization, under any circumstances.  
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Figure 10.   Modified MARS model 
The modified model does not present any connection between experience and 
motivation. Murray writes: 
Motivation is distinguished from other factors that also influence behavior, 
such as the past experience of the person, his physical capabilities, and the 
environmental situation in which he finds himself, although these other 
factors may influence motivation.27  
Dunn and Stephens add that motive lives within an individual’s character (internal drive) 
and guides the set of actions. They note that after achievement of the goal, motive is no 
longer operative. Thus, motivation, as an internal drive, lives within humans despite the 
level of experience they possess. 
3. Motivation 
Much discussion has been made about motivation. Is it an internal drive of 
individuals or a process/set of actions that managers or supervisors should take in order to 
stimulate the workforce to perform as best as it can? According to Connor, the second 
option is a myth that turns out to be a lie. He points out that people motivate themselves. 
Yet, he says, managers and supervisors should direct their actions into creating a working 
environment that will stimulate employees to motivate themselves. Mitchell writes that 
motivation may be the amount of effort that an individual is willing to put in so as to 
perform well any assigned task. Additionally, he mentions that social scientists perceive 
motivation as “psychological processes that cause the arousal, direction, and persistence 
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of behavior.”20 Regardless of the disagreement over potential aspects of defining 
motivation, Mitchell mentions four core values that best characterize it. 
• Motivation traditionally has been cast as an individual phenomenon. 
Each individual is unique and all of the major motivational theories 
allow in one way or another for this uniqueness to be demonstrated.20  
(For example, different people have different needs, expectations, values, 
attitudes, reinforcement histories, and goals.) 
• Motivation usually is described as intentional. That is, motivation 
supposedly is under the employee's control. Most behaviors that are 
seen as influenced by motivation (e.g., effort on the job) typically are 
viewed as actions the individual has chosen to do.20 
• Motivation is multifaceted. The two factors of greatest importance 
have been the arousal (activation, energizers) and direction (choice) of 
behavior.20 
• The purpose of motivational theories is to predict behavior. Motivation 
is concerned with action and the internal and external forces that 
influence one's choice of action. Motivation is not the behavior itself, 
and it is not performance. The behavior is the criterion--that which is 
chosen. And in some cases the chosen action will be a good reflection 
of performance.20 
Given the four core values, a more detailed definition can be expressed. 
‘Motivation becomes the herald to specific behaviors that an individual chooses in order 
to accomplish assigned tasks. Although there are many theories which analyze different 
reasons, all their concepts focus on an individual’s intentional choices to explain 
motivation.’ 
Since motivation surrounds an individual’s intention, it is good to know the cause 
that shapes behaviors. An individual’s primary needs and personal goals—the directed 
internal forces—are the answer. Primary needs send signals to the human brain in order 
to correct potential deficiencies or to maintain an internal equilibrium. Personal goals and 
self-directed internal forces are very similar to primary needs, but now emotions have 




Stewart and Stewart describe it as a five-layer pyramid with a bottom-to-the-top 
directional flow. The description of Maslow’s needs-hierarchy theory is shown in Figure 
11. 
 
Figure 11.   Maslow’s needs hierarchy 
The bottom layer includes physiological needs such as food, water, sleep, shelter, etc. 
The next layer includes safety needs, such as the need to be protected from a potential 
threat. The third layer is related to social needs, that is, the need for companionship with 
people who surround us. The fourth layer includes status needs. These needs include self-
esteem and social esteem. The former comes after the accomplishment of personal 
achievements. The latter is related to social recognition and respect because of the 
positive signals we believe our personality sends out. Status needs are followed by the 
top layer of the pyramid, which includes the need for growth. Growth is the specific 
design to meet new challenges and realize our potential. McShane  and  Von Glinow state 
that  
…according to Maslow, we are motivated simultaneously by several 
needs, but the strongest source is the lowest unsatisfied need at the time. 
As the person satisfies a lower level need, the next higher need in the 
hierarchy becomes the primary motivator and remains so even if never 
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satisfied. Psychological needs are initially the most important and people 
are motivated to satisfy them first.1  
The first four levels, from bottom to top, are also known as deficiency needs. 
They start once deficiencies appear, and they vanish when deficiencies are corrected. The 
growth need is always activated because, under normal circumstances, individuals seek 
their constant personal development.  
In addition to Abraham Maslow’s needs-hierarchy theory, a recently developed 
theory shows that emotions, in terms of incentives, contribute to personal motivation. 
That theory, known as four-drive theory, was developed by Lawrence and Nohria. Four-
drive theory suggests that “people are guided by four basic emotional needs, or drives, 
that are the product of our common evolutionary heritage.”31 These are: 
• The drive to acquire (obtain scarce goods, including intangibles such as social 
status) 
• The drive to bond (either with individuals or groups) 
• The drive to comprehend (satisfy our curiosity and master the world around 
us) 
• The drive to defend (to be secure against external threats)  
These four drives/needs may be correlated to or substituted for one another. They 
also interpret the way people act in their daily lives. However, four-drive theory 
stipulates that when a person wants to be fully motivated, this person needs to satisfy all 
four of them.   
4. Personality 
Personality is an individual characteristic that has many aspects. However, its 
core, in simple words, is about what we are as human beings and how we interact with 
other people. Rogers notes that personality originates from the Latin word persona and 
“persona” means a mask that is 
…worn by every soul on its journey through the world, through human 
life. It is the medium through which we are known to other human beings 
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and communicate with them. We may say that it is a kind of shell, the 
external and superficial part of us.32 
Because each one of us wears his own mask throughout his entire life, the mask 
takes the form of an everlasting pattern of emotions, thoughts, and manners, based on 
which we live and interact with other people within society. A human’s personality 
begins at birth. Thus, from nature’s point of view, personality is the genes that are 
inherited by the parents. While we are growing up, nurture starts to complement nature.  
McShane and Von Glinow explain nurture as “a person’s socialization, life 
experience, and other forms of interaction with the environment.”1 They also say “the 
stability of an individual’s personality increases up to at least age of 30 and possibly to 
age 50, indicating that some personality development and change occurs when people are 
young.”1 As people grow older, their personality is enhanced and altered by every single 
situation and event that happens in their lives. Although there is a huge number of these 
situations and events, the most important, from birth to adolescence, are family 
background, which gives initial principles to a child, and life at school (interaction with 
age-mates imparts additional principles). When becoming adults, decisions about what 
job to do and about what kind of family to create contribute further to the evolution of 
personality. Finally, after individuals have completed their lifecycle, they become 
responsible for teaching their children principles on which they should build their own 
personalities. This cycle explains the fact that, when people grow up, they form solid life 
concepts and their personality becomes stable. However, there is a controversy whether 
nature or nurture contributes more to personality’s final shape.   
The identification of the structure of personality has been studied for centuries. 
The Greek philosopher Aristotle determined that personality was the sum of several 
categories. However, in recent years, the five-factor model of personality, shown in 
Figure 11, is the model most commonly accepted by personality researchers. Judge and 
Bono analyze the model as follows: 
The Big Five traits are broad personality constructs that are manifested in 
more specific traits. Factor 1, Extraversion, represents the tendency to be 
outgoing, assertive, active, and excitement seeking. Individuals scoring 
high on Extraversion are strongly predisposed to the experience of positive 
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emotions (Watson & Clark, 1997). Factor 2, Agreeableness, consists of 
tendencies to be kind, gentle, trusting and trustworthy, and warm. Factor 
3, Conscientiousness, is indicated by two major facets: achievement and 
dependability. Conscientiousness is the trait from the five-factor model 
that best correlates with job performance (Barrick & Mount,1991). Factor 
4, Emotional Adjustment, is often labeled by its opposite, Neuroticism, 
which is the tendency to be anxious, fearful, depressed, and moody. 
Emotional Adjustment is the principal Big Five trait that leads to life 
satisfaction and freedom from depression and other mental ailments 
(McCrae & Costa, 1991). Finally, Factor 5, Openness to Experience 
(sometimes labeled Intellectance), represents the tendency to be creative, 
imaginative, perceptive, and thoughtful. Openness to Experience is the 
only Big Five trait to display appreciable correlations with intelligence.33  
The dimensions of the five-factor model, tendencies that emerge from each dimension 
and the overall effect on an individual’s personality are shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.   Five-factor model of personality (After 1) 
In military environments, evaluations of officers should be based on the content 
of the five-factor model, because each panel of the outcome column indicates an 
appropriate personality that complements the successful accomplishment of tasks.    
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 After the analysis of personal traits such as experience, ability (already an integral 
part of the model), motivation and personality, the MARS model may be further modified 
to its final shape. Job performance is the overall outcome of the contribution of human 
and situational factors. Human factors include role perceptions, abilities, and motivation, 
but only the first two are influenced by the level of experience every individual 
possesses. However, all three factors contain pieces of the personality puzzle. Situational 
factors correspond to situations (e.g., working environment, budget available, etc.), which 
support employee work in any organization. Although situational factors are related to 
experience, they cannot be considered a component of human personality. Job/individual 
performance from the human perspective are shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.   MARS model (final shape) 
 Job performance, despite what military organizations desire, is primarily a 
behavior that humans exhibit under different circumstances. It is influenced by a number 
of traits, among which are experience, ability, motivation and individual personality. 
These traits interact with one another and modify the MARS model twice. The final 
model shows behavior as the output of two inputs: human and situational factors. In other 
words, the output of behavior is another definition of individual performance from the 
human perspective.   
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D. GRADUATE STUDIES 
In general terms, graduate studies represent an advanced level of an individual’s 
education. The question arises about the level of job performance that graduates may 
exhibit. Studies about the relationship between United States naval officers and graduate 
studies have been made in the past. Their results are very interesting. This section will 
examine the relationship between HN officers who possess master’s degrees and the 
potential improvement of their job performance.  
The HN, through its fully funded postgraduate programs (NPS, Harvard 
University, and Grandfield University are the main programs for deck officers), targets a 
positive return on investments (ROI) in the long run. In other words, the HN expects 
officers who possess master degrees to expose their abilities and increase their job 
performance as a result of the knowledge, education, and experiences they obtained 
during their studies. The HN essentially expects these officers to contribute more 
(compared to those who are just graduates of the HNA) to the increased overall 
performance of the entire organization. Three things are worth mentioning: the 
difficulties that an officer of the HN faces when he decides to be a candidate for graduate 
studies, the uncertain time horizon in which the HN seeks tactically positive returns, and 
what it means for the HN for an officer to be certified with a master degree.  
Bowman and Mehay, in their study of the effect of graduate education on the job 
performance of professional employees in a single, large hierarchical organization (the 
USN) present very interesting findings. The data used for the study were drawn from the 
navy’s promotion-history file, which provided background information on all officers 
reviewed for promotions between 1985 and 1990. Essentially, these data come from 
officer-fitness reports.  
Officers are classified into two categories, line and staff. Line officers are in 
aviation, ship and submarine operations, while staff officers are those performing 
administrative functions. Due to characteristics of the military’s internal labor market 
(mission, vertical hierarchy, specific rank structure, etc.), motivation for work effort is 
stimulated by contests or tournaments. Thus, each officer’s promotion rate, or promotion 
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probability, is based on supply (the different sizes of each year’s class/cohorts), demand 
(the vacant slots in each pay grade), an individual’s own ability and effort, and the 
ability/efforts of others in the same grade. They set as the appropriate measurement for 
job performance early-promotion recommendations in officer-fitness reports.  
 
Figure 14.   Descriptive statistics by degree status and occupation (From 34) 
As shown in Figure 14, the variable of “promotion rate” to be higher by ten percentage 
points for those who possess a degree compared to those who do not (for line officers). 
The same is true for staff officers, but the difference goes up to fourteen percentage 
points. Thus, Bowman and Mehay conclude that 
… promotion probabilities are ten to fifteen points higher for those with 
any kind of graduate degree. For those with degrees obtained via the 
Navy’s full-time funded program the differential ranges from fifteen to 
seventeen points. However, when instruments that are uncorrelated with 
promotion are used to predict graduate degree status, the results suggest 
that a sizeable portion of the relationship between graduate education and 
promotion is due to unobserved attributes that lead some people to attend 
(or be selected for) graduate school, especially for the Navy’s program, 
and to be more promotable…. \Nonetheless, it appears reasonable to 
conclude that graduate education in this organization works both directly 
by augmenting firm-specific skills and by providing a mechanism to sort 
individuals of greatest value to the organization. Individuals who are more 
career-oriented and who perform well within this organization signal these 
attributes via their willingness to attend graduate school…. In general, we 
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find that graduate education improves measures of employee job 
productivity.34  
One last observation, which definitely fits for those officers who should be 
promoted to higher ranks, is the generally accepted principle, was also supported by 
Rosen, according to which an individual’s productivity changes as an officer climbs the 
chain of command. Therefore, assignment policies should place top performers/capable 
individuals in the higher-ranking billets. Graduate educational programs of the U.S. Navy 
have a significant positive effect on labor and unit productivity. 
 Mehay, (NPS professor, November 2011), notes benefits of ROI in naval graduate 
education in Figure 15. 
Program Outcomes Benefits to Navy Monetary Values 
I. Increased retention Reduced accessions •Reduced    accession costs 




II. Increased labor 
productivity 
 i . In sub-specialty billets 
ii. In other billets 
•Increased individual and unit 
performance 
•Reduced manpower 
•Reduced labor costs 
III. Increased unit 
productivity  
•Increased unit and output  
readiness 
•Reduced manpower 
•Reduced manpower costs 
Figure 15.   Potential benefits of graduate education  
Figure 15 shows graduate educational programs of the U.S. Navy to have a significant 
positive effect on labor and unit productivity.   
 As with every military organization, the HN targets the development of a 
workforce with core competencies, that is, knowledge, skills, and abilities. Concerning 
education, the HN funds graduate studies in a number of universities, domestically and 
abroad, including NPS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, and 
Granfield University. Officers who attend these programs obtain a broader level of 
education and become further specialized in fields such as electronic engineering, 
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weapon-systems engineering, computer engineering, operational research, naval 
architecture, and management.  
Fully funded programs are not the only option officers have. They can also attend 
off-duty programs in order to get a certificate of graduate studies. However, the majority 
of deck officers with master degrees have graduated from NPS or Granfield University. 
As noted, the HN vision is not only to maintain a workforce with existing core 
competencies, but to further develop knowledge, skills, and abilities through fully funded 
programs and build the entire organization’s success in the long run. O’Connor, Bronner, 
and Delaney, point out that: 
…developing a workforce with core competencies is strategic. Core 
competencies are the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes the 
organization has deemed critical to long-term success, such as creative 
thinking and problem solving; leadership and visioning; and self-
development.”35 
Success is the outcome of an organization’s effective and efficient performance 
that has its roots in the job performance of its employees. Through educational programs, 
the HN seeks an advanced level of job performance from its officers. Furthermore, 
through officer performance, the HN achieves a higher level of productivity. 
 The procedure through which deck officer are selected to attend graduate 
programs should be mentioned. In the beginning of each fiscal year, the HN announces 
the programs available and the number of deck officers who may attend them (the 
available slots). Three stages must be followed. If officers have graduated from the HNA 
with a relatively low GPA, then they follow the first stage, which includes a number of 
tests in different classes (up to approximately six classes) in technical areas. Officers take 
these tests in order to correct their low GPA and be accepted by the institutes. If accepted, 
they enter the second stage, a contest among the officers, again on a number of technical 
classes and some more theoretical ones. Those who achieve the highest scores, as well as 
those who have met the HN minimum requirements enter the last stage. Each class’s 
score has to be higher than 100, and the average higher than 130 (max 200). The third 
stage is officer selection by the Naval Supreme Council. Based on the highest scores, the 
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number of slots, and the number of officers who have met at least the minimum criteria, 
the NSC selects those officers who will finally attend the programs.  
The procedure allows every graduate of the HNA to participate, no matter his 
fitness reports. So it is possible for an officer who might be considered a low performer 
to attend the programs if he gets through the three stages successfully. It is estimated that 
the time required for an adequate preparation for the test of the technical classes is two or 
more years.  
The preceding analysis of job performance, along with the intense effort an 
officer has to put in to be selected for a foreign graduate program, reveal individuals who: 
• have reached the top layer of Maslow’s pyramid of needs hierarchy, the need 
for growth (meeting new challenges and realizing their potential); 
• are self-motivated and driven to acquire an advanced level of knowledge; 
• are driven to comprehend (satisfy their curiosity and master the world around 
them); 
• are characterized by the achievement/dependability tendencies of the five-
factor model of personality, that is, the dimension of conscientiousness; 
• are characterized by the openness-to-experience dimension of the five-factor 
model (Timothy A. Judge and Joyce E. Bono: “openness to experience is the 
only big-five trait to display appreciable correlations with intelligence”33); 
• are determined to combine their experience with further improved cognitive 
skills and so to adopt an “intelligent living”; 
Furthermore, O’Brien, Heppner and Flores state that: 
…self-efficacy has been defined as people’s judgments in their 
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain 
designated types of performance. Self-efficacy has been shown to predict 
choice of behavioral activities, effort expended on these activities, 
persistence despite obstacles, and actual performance.36  
The precedent characteristics are among those that should be present in the 
personality of HN officers. Officers who already possess or are willing to get a master’s 
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degree are individuals who signal persistence, despite obstacles or task difficulty. They 
are individuals who seek further development of their abilities and cognitive skills. In 
general terms, they direct their behavior in such a manner as to accomplish the even more 
difficult task. These are the top performers, and this is exactly what possession of a 
master’s degree means to the HN.  
E. INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE VS MATERIAL 
So far, an analysis of those human factors that should be present in order for an 
individual to exhibit high levels of individual performance has been completed. However, 
human factors and individual effort are not enough. In military environments, having the 
appropriate material plays a significant role because it represents the means of power that 
military personnel need to execute their tasks. Without the appropriate material, the 
success of a distinct mission cannot be achieved, even if the personnel might be capable 
enough. Thus, when an evaluator makes judgments about an officer’s job performance, 
he should always take into account the availability of supporting material. When material 
does not exist, the evaluator should be able to isolate an officer’s potential from the 
means and then make judgments, even if tasks have not been successfully accomplished.   
F. THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 
The military environment is a workplace where extended occupational stressors 
flourish. Some stressors derive from long-lasting deployments away from home; others, 
from exposure to dangerous and unhealthy working conditions. Dolan and Adler write: 
“Deployment-related stressors have also been shown to affect psychological and physical 
health both during deployment and after return to the home station.”37 Stressors may also 
be present due to a variety of workplace attitudes. “Attitudes represent the cluster of 
beliefs, assessed feelings, and behavioral intentions towards a person, object or event,”1 
and they form the individual’s working environment. Finally, new technologies such as 
the Internet, which have wired employees to their jobs, heavy workloads, and many hours 
at work, are other sources of stress. Williams points out that “it is not surprising that too 
many demands or too many hours was the trigger of workplace stress cited most often by 
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workers in 2000 (34%). In addition, 15% cited poor interpersonal relations, and 13% 
cited risk of accident and injury.”38 She adds that 
…not all stress is negative; research has shown that individuals function 
best in a work setting that places reasonable demands on them. One 
example of positive stress might be preparing for a job interview. While 
the preparation may be stressful, getting the resulting promotion is 
perceived for the most part as a positive event. And many Canadians view 
stress in a positive light. Indeed, about four in ten respondents in the 
Canadian Mental Health Survey said that the amount of workplace stress 
they experienced had a positive effect on their performance, while about 
three in ten felt it had a negative effect.38  
Nonetheless, too much stress leads to poor performance, even though individuals 
might be very capable. Especially in military environments, moderate stress should be in 
place in order to achieve a high level of performance, but too much stress should be 
avoided. The reasons are that military personnel use means of technology that provide an 
extremely wide range of power. Their misuse under heavy stress can have fatal 
consequences. 
G. TURNING JOB PERFORMANCE INTO NUMERICAL VALUES 
Job performance is depicted through fitness reports. After the analysis of the 
military’s characteristics and definitions of job performance from the human perspective, 
a list with endogenous and exogenous traits that reflect each officer’s job performance 
within the HN can be extracted. Endogenous traits correspond to personality, and 
exogenous traits are those related to the environment (working conditions). Higher scores 
in that list will indicate top performers (war officers) who will be promoted to higher pay 
grades within the primary war inventory. The lower performers will be transferred to the 
auxiliary inventory. It is worth mentioning that top performers have significant 
opportunities to develop their career, since the absorbing state for them will be the rank 
of flag officers.  
A general model showing how all endogenous and exogenous elements play 
important roles in the behavior (job performance) of every officer in the working 
environment is presented in Figure 16. Concerning the endogenous traits (human factors), 
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one can see the interactions of experience with both the environment (in terms of stress) 
and KSA. This is logical. As the level of experience goes up, it correlates with each 
individual’s potential. Also, officers may become more flexible or more narrow minded, 
and that has an immediate effect on the quality of their behavior/output. Additionally, 
graduate studies contribute to an advanced level of KSA and increased motivation for 
further developing careers. The HN always supports its personnel. Its fully funded 
graduate programs display the beliefs of Baruch about the new role of organizations.  
On the one hand, the career is the “property” of the individual, who may 
be inspired by new social norms, but on the other hand, for employed 
people, it is planned and managed to a large extent by their 
organizations…. \Instead, the organization has a new significant role being 
supportive, enabler, developer of its human assets.39 
Thus the HN, indeed, acts as a developer of its human assets. Concerning 
exogenous traits, the situational factors and the appropriate supporting material contribute 
to the final output of every officer’s behavior. However, in the absence of exogenous 
traits, officers should be evaluated based exclusively on their endogenous traits.        
 
Figure 16.   General model of traits that designate job performance. 
The general model essentially reveals the specific areas in which officers of the 
HN should distinguish themselves if they want to develop their careers. However, there 
are also a few other areas that need to be included in the list, even though they have not 
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been analyzed. The process of turning job performance into one single numerical value 
includes three steps. 
1. Step One of Turning Job Performance into a Single Numerical Value  
Step one in turning job performance into a single numerical value lists the general 
categories in which officers should be evaluated (measurement of job performance). 
These categories are the following:  
• Health/body conditions 
This category has not been analyzed, yet it is considered paramount within 
military organizations. Of course, some officers, during their careers, may 
have health disorders. In such cases, transferring them to the auxiliary 
inventory does not necessarily mean they are poor performers. Instead, such 
placement protects these officers from worsening health since the assigned 
tasks are less stressful. In case they recover, they may be able to return to the 
war inventory, based on performance.  
• Level of experience. Mentality level. Personal core values/courage 
• Management qualifications 
• Professional proficiency 
• Naval proficiency and experience 
• Ethical values/morality 
• Class seniority (graduation from HNA) 
• Class seniority (graduation from lieutenant, junior grade, general training). 
• Possession of a graduate-studies certificate 
2. Step Two of Turning Job Performance into a Single Numerical Value 
The second step is to tabulate every category with its subsets. Appendix A 
includes the tabulated categories. The first column of each table displays the category of 
evaluation and its subsets. In general terms, the sum of those categories reflects an 
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officer’s level of job performance. The second column includes those characteristics of 
military organizations that have as premises the elements of the first column. The third 
and fourth columns show the elements of the five-factor and MARS models that are 
related to the corresponding subsets. The last column indicates how measurements are 
applied.  
Subjective measurements are very attitudinal, due to the critical thinking of the 
evaluators. Measurements that are not subjective will not be analyzed in this thesis for the 
reason that, in some cases, other departments not directly related to an officer’s service 
should provide the evaluator with their estimation. For example, naval hospitals should 
provide evaluators a number from 1–10 that describes an officer’s health and should 
establish their own criteria for judgment. In other cases, suggestions are given so that 
decision makers can establish criteria in order to turn the number of accomplished tasks 
within every service into a single figure that corresponds to officer performance.  
An important note should be made about experience. Whenever an officer is 
promoted, he starts over at the lowest level of experience because, despite the years of 
service, the thesis considers experience in a new pay grade with new duties to be 
insufficient.  
Measurements for the three categories i, j and k of appendix A are fixed numbers. 
Each leadership may decide how many points to assign to an officer, given officer’s 
seniority and the possession or not of an advanced degree. In this thesis, a suggestion is 
made about the assigned points to facilitate the turn of job performance into a single 
monetary value. In any case, the pattern of turning performance into a metric remains the 
same, no matter the point system adopted. Category i describes the class seniority that 
results when deck officers graduate from the HNA. In order to assign points, each 
cohort/class is divided into five groups, each group containing the same number of 
officers. Suppose there are fifty officers. The first ten officers (constituting the first 
group) may receive ten points in their fitness report due to their significant seniority. The 
second, third, fourth, and fifth group get eight, six, four, and two points, respectively. 
Nonetheless, class seniority may change after the nine-month general training that 
officers have to attend when promoted to lieutenant, junior grade (O2). Thus, category j 
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refers to the potential change in class seniority, and the pattern, followed to assign points 
in fitness reports, is identical with the restated pattern of category i. Category k refers to 
the possession of an advanced degree. Officers who have attended fully funded programs 
abroad get three points due to the difficulties of the selection process described in the 
section on graduate studies. Those with degrees from domestic institutions get 1.5 points. 
Officers without an advanced degree receive no points in this category.  
3. Step Three of Turning Job Performance into a Single Numerical 
Value 
The third step is very important because performance is now turning into a single 
numerical value. Among other criteria, according to ordinance 167/A/2010, officers 
should spend a specific length of service in every pay grade in order to be qualified for 
promotion. When the officer completes the required years of service, the decision for 
promotion to the next higher rank is based on job performance scores earned in officer’s 
present pay grade. In other words, job performance scores at the end of the required years 
of service include the sum of the scores of all annual fitness reports within the specific 
pay grade. The process is as follows: 
• All subsets/categories are graded in a range of one to ten. Currently the 
evaluation system in the HN includes a range of scores from one to 100. This 
scoring system should change, because such an extended range becomes too 
subjective and tends to inflate final scores. 
• Evaluators fill up the subjective subsets of each category based on their 
critical thinking. Then they fill the non-subjective subsets with the proper 
points established by specific criteria (e.g. categories i, j, k).  
• The sum of the subsets divided by their total number is the final score for each 
category (from a to k). When all categories are placed in a row, we get a 
matrix Aij where its dimensions are i=1 (one officer) and j=11 (the number of 
categories). The simulated scores of fifteen officers in all categories: five 
officers each in the O3, O4, and O5 pay grades are shown in Table 2. The 
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second column shows the simulated year of service for every officer in the 
specific pay grade. In these pay grades the required time of service is six 
years. 
Table 2.   Scores in general categories of evaluation   
 
• A new concept for the HN is suggested, based on the observation that no 
officer is perfect because no person on earth is perfect. Thus, the NSC, given 
its military characteristics, but mainly the HN’s national mission, has to 
establish priorities, in terms of weight for each category. Worth must be 
assigned to each category. In this thesis, the weights vary from 0.1 to 1 and 
weights have been set subjectively. Of course, the NSCl may adjust them. The 
model will not change.  
• In this phase, a matrix Bjk is created where j=11 (the number of categories) 
and k=1 (the weight of every category). The different weights for every 
general category of evaluation and pay grade are shown in Table 3. It is 




because as an officer climbs the chain of command, he needs to develop 
leadership skills. Thus, different weights reflect the priorities of the HN for 
these skills among the pay grades.  
Table 3.   Weights of general categories 
O3 O4 O5
Categories weight weight weight
a 0.70 a 0.60 a 0.70
b 0.60 b 0.70 b 1.00
c 0.80 c 0.90 c 0.90
d 0.40 d 0.40 d 0.40
e 1.00 e 1.00 e 0.80
f 1.00 f 1.00 f 1.00
g 0.90 g 0.80 g 0.60
h 0.50 h 0.50 h 0.50
i 0.20 i 0.20 i 0.20
j 0.10 j 0.10 j 0.10
k 0.30 k 0.30 k 0.30  
• Next the two matrices are multiplied, and the result is a new matrix C with 
dimensions 1x1. In other words, we get a number that corresponds to the 
overall job performance of every officer, as the second column of Table 4 
shows. The formula that justifies the above multiplication is the following: 
 ij jk ikA B C× =   
 where i = 1, j = 11 , k = 1. 
• Within a service, the annual average grade (or the median, which might be 
better) of every evaluator is estimated (Table 4, second column). This is 
different for every pay grade. For instance, if a service is manned with five 
O3s, five O4s and five O5s, then there should be three different averages of 
fitness reports for each pay grade. 
• The results of differences between the scores of fitness reports and evaluator 
averages are summed and shown in the third column of Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Scores of fitness reports, evaluator’s averages, final difference 
rank perform average difference
O3 45.87 48.816 2.946
O3 47.04 48.816 1.776
O3 51.08 48.816 -2.264
O3 49.9 48.816 -1.084
O3 50.19 48.816 -1.374
O4 47.3 48.872 1.572
O4 48.23 48.872 0.642
O4 48.85 48.872 0.022
O4 49.77 48.872 -0.898
O4 50.21 48.872 -1.338
O5 44.52 47.85 3.33
O5 46.59 47.85 1.26
O5 46.53 47.85 1.32
O5 48.95 47.85 -1.1
O5 52.66 47.85 -4.81  
• The same procedure is followed for fitness reports filled out in the past six 
years for all officers. At the end of the sixth year, all the differences are 
summed up and the total score of each officer’s job performance is computed. 
This is the overall performance in the specific pay grade. The scores can be 
positive or negative. A positive job performance indicates someone who 
exhibits higher performance than an officer with a negative score.  
The use of weights and the calculation of each evaluator’s averages are used to 
eliminate subjectivity. Especially for the averages (the step that leads to the calculation of 
differences), elimination of each evaluator’s subjectivity is achieved when the averages 
are placed on the x-axis of a graph, and differences are measured from that axis. 
However, calculating only the average may not be enough. Minimum and 
maximum grades of every evaluator should also be taken into account. It is important that 
this be done because of the various potential ranges of grades among evaluators. Various 
ranges may lead to selection errors. Thus, a mathematical model should be developed to 
normalize the restated ranges so that a common ground exists among all evaluators.  
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Fitness reports are documents that show the job performance of an officer in a 
military environment. Job performance is a combination of endogenous and exogenous 
traits in the HN. Endogenous traits correspond to each individual’s personality, and 
exogenous traits are those related to environment (working conditions). In this thesis, 
exogenous traits are considered stable, and job performance is measured based solely on 
endogenous traits. Their analysis indicates which categories should be evaluated and, 
furthermore, what subsets are included within the general categories. Indeed, few subsets 
may be measured based on actual events. The rest are subjective, so the need to eliminate 
evaluator subjectivity emerges. 
For that reason, weighting is applied to every category to indicate the priorities of 
importance that leadership should establish. Additionally, evaluator averages enter the 
process of turning job performance into one single numerical value so as to overcome the 
obstacles of subjectivity. In the end, a single number—positive or negative—represents 
overall job performance. Officers with positive figures exhibit a higher level of 
performance than those with negative scores.  
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III. THE MARKOV-CHAIN MODEL 
A. DATA FOR DECK OFFICERS OF THE HELLENIC NAVY 
 Information concerning deck officers of the Hellenic navy is divided into three 
categories. 
1. Inventory of Data of HN Officers  
The first category of officer distribution at every pay grade of the existing 
inventory in 2010 is shown in Table 5. The two parallel inventories research is still 
underway.  
Table 5.   Number of existing deck officers in each pay grade and corresponding billets 
Pay grades Existing number of 
deck officers 
Billets 
Ensign or O1 
 
74 400 
Lieutenant, Junior or O2 
 
282 
Lieutenant or O3 
 
302 284 
Lt. Commander or O4 
 
266 217 
Commander or O5 
 
201 198 
Captain or O6 
 
80 79 
Commodore or O7 
 
19 18 
Rear Admiral or O8 
 
7 7 
Vice Admiral or O9 
 
2 2 
Chief of Hellenic Navy 
General Staff  
1 1 
 
Table 5 shows that there are no separate billets for the first and second pay grades. 
Furthermore, the sum of O1s and O2s is less than the corresponding billets. Unlike O1s 
and O2s, the population of O3s, O4s and O5s exceeds the corresponding billets. 
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Concerning O7s, this is not a serious problem since their population is almost equal to the 
billets. The rest of the pay grades are not of concern for this thesis because they are 
considered the absorbing states of deck officers. The number of officers and billets in the 
HN are shown in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17.   Officers of the HN and corresponding billets in each pay grade. 
2. Second Category of Data of HN Officers 
The years of service required at each pay grade, according to ordinance 
167/A/2010 is shown in Table 6.  
Table 6.   Required years by pay grade. 
Pay grades Required years in 
each pay grade 
Total years of 
service 
Ensign or O1 
 
4 9 
Lieutenant, Junior or O2 
 
5 
Lieutenant or O3 
 
6 15 
Lt. Commander or O4 
 
6 21 
Commander  or O5 
 
6 27 





It is worth mentioning that an officer with 31 years of service has essentially 
completed 35 years of service, since his time spent in the Hellenic Naval Academy (four 
years of studies) is added to service time. Thus, he is qualified for a full pension.  
Promotions from O1s to O2s are made at the completion of their fourth year of service. 
Correspondingly, O2s are promoted to O3s on the completion of their fifth year of 
service as O2s. The same procedure applies for the rest of the pay grades of the chain of 
command. 
3. Third Category of Data of HN Officers 
The third category of detailed information concerning the distribution of officers 
in each pay grade (classes) along with their graduation year from the HNA, is shown in 
Table 7. This is important because, though promotions to the next pay grade are 
implemented based on various criteria, the basic premise is to complete the required years 
of service. 
 
Figure 18.   Graduation ceremony in the HNA 
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Table 7.   Number of graduates, year of graduation, total officers 
 
      
Year of graduation 2008 1990 1995 1991 1984 1981 
Number of grads 32 1 1 38 1 2 
Year of graduation 2009 2001 1996 1992 1986 1982 
Number of grads 24 1 32 49 1 6 
Year of graduation 2010 2002 1997 1993 1987 1983 
Number of grads 18 48 1 49 35 10 
Year of graduation  2003 1997 1994 1988 1984 
Number of grads  61 50 41 34 19 
Year of graduation  2004 1998 1995 1989 1985 
Number of grads  50 74 53 54 16 
Year of graduation  2005 1999 1995 1990 1986 
Number of grads  47 59 2 51 23 
Year of graduation  2006 2000 1996 1991 1987 
Number of grads  38 37 34 25 4 
Year of graduation  2007 2001    
Number of grads  36 1    
Year of graduation   2001    
Number of grads   47    
pool  2 3 2 2 8 
Not in the pool 74 280 299 264 199 72 
Total 74 282 302 266 201 80 
The shaded areas in Table 7 indicate officers who have been excluded from promotion 
procedures. For some reason, they are not qualified for promotion, and they continue in 
the same pay grade until they complete the required 35 years of service to receive a full 
pension. This specific category of officers comprises the pool. 
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK/DESCRIPTION OF MARKOV-CHAIN 
MODELS 
 Military organizations, as has been stated, build their chain of command on a 
specific rank structure. In other words, there are fixed ranks and billets through which an 
officer may climb the chain of command. The HN can be referred to as a heterogeneous 
system, a system that classifies people to “such things as grades, age, or location.”40 
Therefore, the HN manpower system is perceived “as a set of interconnected stocks and 
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flows.”40 Stocks are the distribution of officers in each pay grade and the total officer 
population. Flows represent the transitions to the next state. To facilitate both the 
understanding and control of the stated set of quantities (for stocks and flows), a dynamic 
model is applied. This model will exhibit the effects of different applied strategies and 
policies to these sets of quantities. This dynamic model (the Markov-Chain models), 
should take into consideration restraints (transition probabilities) and limits (vacancies in 
billets) that flow from the specific rank structure, applying strategies, policies, and 
assumptions about an officer’s job performance. The model, while changing its inputs, 
can be a useful tool estimating various manpower outcomes concerning the number of 
officers that the HN wants to employ throughout the years and under alternative policies.  
Based on the transition probabilities, which are the primary input of the model 
and represent the states in which an officer, at the end of a year, may remain at the same 
rank or be promoted to the next higher rank, or leave the military, the model can be used 
to estimate a number of manpower outputs. One of the outputs presents the total 
population of officers of the HN after n-years, given as a second input a fixed number of 
office accessions (R[T], where R is the number of accessions at time T). It is important to 
mention that the HN recruits officers only from one source, the HNA. Thus, accessions 
are implemented only in the pay grade of O1.  
Another output of the model might be to compute the number of appropriate 
accessions that should be implemented every year for the HN to maintain a fixed total 
population of officers. Again, the primary input would be the fixed transition 
probabilities, whereas the second input—this time—is the goal of a fixed officer 
population. The model, in addition, presents the distribution of officers in each pay grade 
throughout the years.  
The model can also be used in a number of other versions. An example would be 
to calculate the number of appropriate accessions so as to increase the total number of 
officers by a certain percentage for every year. Another possibility would be to estimate 
the average length of officer service in each pay grade. Unfortunately, the last version 
cannot be applied to the HN, because of restrictions related to the required years of 
service in each pay grade as shown in Table 6.  
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Nonetheless, the thesis uses Markov models to help the HN maintain a fixed total-
officer population for a time horizon of five years and to correct the deficiencies related 
to distribution of officers to the corresponding billets in every pay grade.   
C. METHODOLOGY OF THE MARKOV-CHAIN MODEL 
 The following analysis demonstrates the methodology used by Markov-chain 
models through sort examples. The first two examples include the states of continuing in 
the same rank or being promoted to the next higher rank. The third example contains the 
former two states plus the “attrite” state. 
1. Calculation of Distribution of Officers in Each Pay Grade under 
Steady-Transition Probabilities (States of Continuing Unpromoted or 
Being Promoted)   
Suppose that in the year 2000 a military organization includes officers of three 
pay grades, in particular O1s, O2s and O3s. The transition probabilities of these officers 
is shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.   States and Transitions  
Table 8 does not contain a wastage option. Thus, the sum of probabilities in every pay 
grade is less than one (the maximum value of a probability is one, whereas the minimum 
is zero). The matrix used in Markov-chain models with a probability of 0.7 for an O1 
officer to continue in the same pay grade for another year and a probability of 0.1 for his 




officer has a probability of 0.85 of continuing in the same pay grade for one more year, 
whereas his promotion probability is 0.05. Finally, the corresponding probability for an 
O3 to continue as an O3 is 0.85.  
Table 8.   Transition probabilities 
 
The military organization recruits officers on an annual basis in every pay grade. The 
number of accessions is fixed [R(T) : (48, 11, 5)]. In other words, the organization 
recruits 48 officers in the first pay grade, eleven officers in the second pay grade and five 
officers in the last pay grade, as Table 9 shows. 
Table 9.   Fixed recruits per pay grade.  
 
Furthermore, the distribution of officers in the organization’s inventory for the same year, 
n(2000), is shown in Table 10.   
Table 10.   Number of officers in each pay grade for the year 2000. 
O1s O2s O3s
n(2000) 200 150 73  
The question is how many officers the organization will employ in each pay grade in the 
year 2001.  
Starting from the O1s, the probability of continuing in the same pay grade for one 
more year is 0.7 (70%). There are also 48 recruits (a fixed number for every year). Thus, 
140 officers continue as O1s.  
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Adding the 48 recruits, the number of O1s (year 2001) becomes 188 officers. Equation 
(1) shows the calculation of officers in the first pay grade for the year 2001. 
 1 11: (2001) 150 0.7 48 (2001) 188o oO n n= • + ⇒ =  (1) 
 The same equation is used to compute the number of officers of the second pay 
grade (O2). However, one difference in the O2 pay grade is that, apart from those officers 
who continue as O2s and the eleven recruits, there are also a few officers (O1s) who are 
promoted to O2s. Thus, there is an additional term in equation (2): 
 2 22 : (2001) 150 0.85 11 200 0.10 (2001) 158o oO n n= • + + • ⇒ ≈  (2) 
The same pattern applies for the last pay grade, due to three sources of officers: 
officers who continue as O3s, officers promoted to O3 and five new recruits. Thus: 
 3 33 : (2001) 73 0.85 5 150 0.05 (2001) 74o oO n n= • + + • ⇒ ≈  (3) 
The distribution of officers in each pay grade and the total officer population for the years 
2000 and 2001 is shown in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Status of officers in 2000 and 2011 
 
2. Calculation of Accessions under Steady Transition Probabilities and a 
Steady Total Number of Officers (States of Continuing or Being 
Promoted) 
Unlike the previous example, the problem in this case is to calculate the number 
of accessions in the first pay grade in order to maintain a fixed total population of officers 
throughout the years. Additionally, the model estimates how the distribution of officers in 
pay grades is being reformed. In other words, using the same information as in the 
previous example—transition probabilities, distribution of officers in the year 2000 and 
total population of officers (423)—the organization wants to find how many officers (as 
O1s) need to be recruited and the final distribution of its officers in order to maintain a 
total workforce of 423 individuals. 
The O1s for the year 2001 will be equal to: 
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 1 1 1 11: (2001) 200 0.7 (2001) 140o oO n x n x= • + ⇒ = +  (4) 
where x1 is the number of recruits in the first pay grade. 
The number of O2s for the year 2001 will be equal to: 
 2 2 22 : (2001) 200 0.1 150 0.85 0 (2001) 147o oO n x n= • + • + • ⇒ ≈  (5) 
where x2 is the number of recruits in the second pay grade. However, in this example, the 
organization does not recruit officers as O2s. Thus, x2 is multiplied by zero. 
The number of O3s for the year 2001 will be equal to: 
 3 3 33 : (2001) 150 0.05 73 0.85 0 (2001) 70o oO n x n= • + • + • ⇒ ≈  (6) 
where x3 is the number of O3 recruits. As with O2s, there are no recruits in the third pay 
grade, so x3 is multiplied by zero.   
Now, the organization wants to maintain the same workforce of 423 officers for 
the year 2001. Thus, equations (4), (5) and (6) are totaled and their sum is equal to 423 
officers, 
 1 1 1140 147 70 423 357 423 66x x x+ + + = ⇒ + = ⇒ =  (7) 
which is the number of recruits (as O1s) needed for the organization to maintain the same 
workforce. If we substitute x1 = 66 in equation (4), then the number of O1s (for the year 
2001) becomes 206 individuals. The results are tabulated in Table 12.  




Figure 20.   Differences in distribution of officers (2000, 2001) 
3. Calculation of Distribution of Officers in Each Pay Grade under 
Steady Transition Probabilities and Increased Number of Total 
Inventory (States of Continuing or Being Promoted or Attrited) 
 This example is more complex because all three states are present. The three 
states and the transition probabilities are shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.   States and transition probabilities 
The transition tabulations probabilities are shown in Table 13. Unlike the examples with 
two states as input, this example uses all three of them and the sum of the corresponding 
transition probabilities equals one. That always happens when all three states are present.  
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Table 13.   Transition probabilities for the three states 
 
The organization’s inventory for the year 2000 is shown in Table 14. In this example, the 
organization has set as its goal employing 150 more officers at the beginning of the year 
2002. The starting inventory is 1000 officers (year 2000). However, there are few 
restrictions concerning the 150 officers. The first year (2001), the organization wants to 
increase its workforce by 100 officers and no more. In the second year, the organization 
wants to employ 50 more officers. This pattern increases the workforce of the 
organization to 1100 officers the first year and to 1150 officers (the goal) in the second 
year. As with Example 2, accessions are referred only to the first rank.  
Table 14.    Organization’s inventory (2000) 
 
Given the stated information, the challenge that emerges is the calculation of the 
appropriate number of accessions that the organization should implement. 
Starting from the year 2001, the solution is similar to the solution of the second 
example. The state of attrition covers the difference that has to be taken into account. The 




Figure 22.   Computation of inventory of officers in each pay grade 
Attrition for the year 2001 is equal to: 
 (2001) 250 0.05 250 0.1 300 0.05 200 0.2 (2001) 92.5 93att attn n= • + • + • + • ⇒ = ≈  (8) 
The organization’s inventory for the year 2001 should be 1100 officers. Thus, the sum of 
equations (1) to (4), shown in figure 22, must equal 1100. 
 1 1125 237 355 190 1100 193x x+ + + + = ⇒ =  (9) 
Now, we substitute x1 = 193 in equation (1) of figure 22 and the inventory of O1s for the 
year 2001 is figured at 318 officers. Table 15 shows the distribution of officers in years 
2000–2001.  
Table 15.   Distribution of officers for the year 2000–2001 
 O1s O2s O3s O4s TOTAL Attrition 
2000 250 250 300 200 1000 0 
2001 318 237 355 190 1100 93 
 Moving to the next year (2002), the same process is followed. However the 
inventory of 2001 (Table 15) will be the basis for the new equations to be set up. 
 The previous examples involve the arithmetic, but time-consuming, approach of 
the Markov-chain models. Nevertheless, the arithmetic approach is the foundation, based 
on which Excel may quickly solve similar problems. Furthermore, the model of the third 
example is the basic tool this thesis uses to adjust and calculate the inventory of officers 
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of the HN in every pay grade within a time horizon of five years. Unlike the previous 
examples, the HN’s transition probabilities are not fixed, nor are they input. Instead, they 
will be output.   
D. CRITERIA REVIEW 
 The HN has established various criteria for promotions, whose analysis is 
presented in the following description.  
• There are two categories that comprise the basis of officer promotions, both 
mentioned in ordinance 167/Α/ 24.9.2010. The first category is the specific 
time of service in every pay grade that sets aside early promotions, making 
them meaningless for the HN. The second category is relative to the first one, 
since it designates specific time of service at sea within every pay grade. 
Service at sea is crucial for officers with pay grades from O1 to O5. Service at 
sea is described in Table 16 (blue cells). 
Table 16.   Required years of service at sea, required years of service in each pay grade  
Pay grades Required years of 
service at sea. 
Required years of 
service in each pay 
grade 
Ensign or O1 
 
3 4 
Lieutenant, Junior or O2 
 
3 5 
Lieutenant or O3 
 
3 6 
Lt. Commander or O4 
 
2 6 
Commander or O5 
 
2 6 
The criteria for service at sea differ for captains (or O6s). In order to be qualified 
for promotion to the next higher rank (flag officers), captains should have served a 
minimum of ten years at sea during their entire career. Furthermore, they should also 
have served as commanders of a squadron of ships or of specific services ashore. In this 
thesis, the criterion of service at sea takes into consideration the following:  
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• The vacancies in every pay grade. 
• The sizes of each year’s classes (or cohorts). The class sizes in every pay 
grade are shown in Figures 23 to 28.  
 
Figure 23.   Cohort sizes in the pay grade of O1s 
 
Figure 24.   Cohort sizes in the pay grade of O2s 
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Figure 25.   Cohort sizes in the pay grade of O3s 
 
Figure 26.   Cohort sizes in the pay grade of O4s 
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Figure 27.   Cohort sizes in the pay grade of O5s 
 
Figure 28.   Cohort sizes in the pay grade of O6s 
In Figures 23 to 28, officers already in the “pool” have been excluded. The scores 
of job performance are taken into account in the promotion process. Nonetheless, a 
reformed calculation of job performance (see Chapter II, section F, and Chapter III) 
revolutionizes the process of promotions.    
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E. SUMMARY 
Rank structure is a basic characteristic of military organizations. In particular, 
fixed ranks and billets comprise the chain of command in which officers evolve. The rank 
structure points to a heterogeneous system, a system that classifies people in such things 
as grades. As with other military organizations, the HN’s promotion processes are based 
on stocks and flows. Stocks are the distribution of officers in every pay grade and the 
total population of officers. Flows are the transitions to the next state. A dynamic model 
such as Markov-chain model facilitates both the understanding and control of stocks and 
flows after the implementation of various strategies and policies. When changing inputs 
in Markov-chain models, manpower experts can estimate different manpower outcomes 
about military personnel.  
Primarily, the model is based on transition probabilities (primary input) to 
estimate the size of manpower output. One output might be the total population of HN 
officers after a few years, when the second input is a fixed number of accessions. An 
important issue for the HN is that accessions of officers are only implemented in the first 
pay grade of the HN chain of command. Another output of the model might be the 
calculation of appropriate accessions when the second input is a fixed population of the 
HN workforce throughout a specific time horizon. In this case, a distribution of officers 
in every pay grade is also calculated.  
Regardless of the change of input in Markov-Chain models and the established 
criteria of the HN promotion processes, this thesis (chapter IV) uses little input as a basic 
platform for calculations. This input is size of each year’s classes (cohorts), the vacancies 
in each pay grade, the specific time of service in every pay grade, and the scores of job 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE MARKOV-CHAIN 
MODEL FOR THE HELLENIC NAVY 
A. MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE HN 
The Hellenic navy confronts two major problems. The first one is to conform to 
ordinance 167/Α/ 24.9.2010 concerning required years of service in each pay grade. The 
second is to correct the deficiencies that exist in the primary war-inventory. In other 
words, the HN desires to match the number of officers in each pay grade with 
corresponding billets, within a time horizon of five years. For that reason, the alternative 
plan of two parallel inventories, war and auxiliary, should be established. 
In this case, in order to apply Markov models to HN inventory, transition 
probabilities will be simulated based on the information in Table 18.  
B. FIXING DEFICIENCIES AMONG CLASSES AND REQUIRED YEARS 
OF SERVICE 
The HN desires to correct deficiencies in its officer inventory and to adjust the 
distribution of officers to corresponding billets within five years. Table 17 shows these 
deficiencies for the year 2010, concerning classes (graduation year) and time of service in 
each pay grade according to ordinance 167/Α/ 24.9.2010. 
Table 17.   Gaps between classes (year of graduation) and required years of service in all 
pay grades (year 2010) 
 
In order to mesh classes with required years of service in every pay grade and 
then apply Markov models, a few new policies should be adopted. The following policies 
are suggested: 
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• Starting from ensigns (or O1s), the 2008 class should be divided into two 
cohorts. Officers of the first pay grade (O1s) are very young; thus, the criteria 
for their promotion should combine their seniority and the scores of their job 
performance. By maintaining part of the 2008 class as O1s, a match between 
the classes of O1s and the requirements of ordinance 167/Α/ 24.9.2010 
(required time of service in each pay grade) is achieved, especially when 2011 
grads enter the chain of command.  
• Unlike O1s, officers of the 2002 and 2003 classes (O2s) should be promoted 
to the next pay grade. However, due to their total number, it is not possible for 
all of them to be promoted to the next pay grade. Thus, only the 2002 class 
will be promoted in the first year.    
• Likewise O2s, those left from the class of 1996 (32 officers) and a few 
officers from the class of 1997 should move to the next state (promotion to 
O4s or transfer to auxiliary inventory). It is worth mentioning that the1996 
class has already been divided into two cohorts, because 34 officers are 
already O4s. However, after the promotion process of the second cohort, the 
class is united. 
• As with officers of the classes of 1996–1997, the 1991 and 1992 classes of 
lieutenant commanders (or O4s) should move to the next state (promotion or 
transfer to the auxiliary inventory). Again, the 1991 class has already been 
divided into two cohorts because 25 grads are already O5s. 
• Concerning commanders (or O5s), only a few officers of the second cohort of 
class 1987 (35 officers) should move to the next state and be united with the 
first cohort of that class (four officers).  
• Finally, for the time being, early promotions are meaningless for the HN. 
However, this policy needs to be revised, and doing so will definitely affect 
transition probabilities. 
The restated suggestions of flow of officers for the period 2010–2011 are 
presented in Tables 18, 19.  
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Table 18.   Classes of officers in each pay grade for the year 2010 
 
Table 19.   Classes of officers in each pay grade for the year 2011 
 
One sees that for the first year (2010 to 2011) early promotions should be adopted 
for the classes of 1997 and 1992 as shown in Tables 18, 19.  
C. CALCULATION OF ACCESSIONS FOR THE PERIOD 2010–2011 
It has already been stated that one of the basic criteria for an officer of the HN to 
be promoted is specific time of service in each pay grade. Thus, only those officers who 
are in the last year of service in each pay grade may be promoted. However, a few 
admissions should be made in order for the HN to maintain the fixed inventory of 1178 
officers (equal to the billets of O1s to O6s) for a time horizon of five years. These 
admissions are the following: 
• Those officers in the pool are excluded from the promotion process. 
• Accessions in the first pay grade should range between 50 and 65 per year.  
• For O1s and O2s, there are only two states: continue in the same pay grade for 
one more year and be promoted to the next higher rank. 
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• For pay grades O3, O4 and O5, there is one additional state, being transferred 
to the auxiliary inventory. The third state can also be characterized as the 
absorbing state. The question that emerges in this situation is which officers 
from which classes will be transferred to the auxiliary inventory. Decision 
makers should designate the classes. Then, the answer is based on job 
performance scores. Having analyzed the way in which job performance 
scores are calculated, the HN will transfer those officers with the lowest 
scores to the auxiliary inventory.  
• For O6s, promotion to flag officer and transfer to the auxiliary inventory is 
considered their absorbing state. 
The calculation of transition probabilities of officers is shown in Tables 20 to 25.    
Table 20.   Transition rates of O1s (2010–2011) 
 
Table 21.   Transition rates of O2s (2010–2011)    
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Table 22.   Transition rates of O3s (2010–2011) 
 
Table 23.   Transition rates of O4s (2010–2011) 
 
Table 24.   Transition rates of O5s (2010–2011) 
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Table 25.   Transition rates of O6s (2010–2011) 
 
Transition rates in Tables 20 to 25 are inputs to the calculation of accessions for 
the first period, 2010 to 2011, shown in Table 26.  
Table 26.   Accessions—flow of officers for the year 2010–2011   
 
Table 26 shows the number of accessions in the first pay grade (60 officers) and 
the distribution of officers in the year 2011, given the calculated transition probabilities 
and the fixed total population of 1178 officers.  
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Table 27.   Distribution of officers in the year 2011 
 
A synopsis of the calculations for the period between 2010-2011 is shown in Table 27. 
Distribution of officers in every pay grade along with their date of graduation from the 
HNA is also presented. Furthermore, it is obvious that early promotions applied to the 
classes of 1992 and 1997. As a result, these classes were divided into two segments. 
There are some deficiencies concerning the distribution of officers in pay grades and 
designated billets, despite the fixed total number of officers. In particular, the total 
number of O1s and O2s is less than the number of designated billets by 34 officers, and 
there are more O3s and O4s than the billets by one and 33 officers, respectively. The 
distribution of O5s and O6s is equal to the corresponding billets. Finally, the classes in 
the second pay grade (O2) should be reduced to five so that the chain of command can be 
fully aligned with ordinance 167/Α/ 24.9.2010.  
In order to minimize existing deficiencies and to apply Markov models, the HN 
should designate fixed transition probabilities for a four-year period. Whenever 
necessary, officers with the lowest scores in job performance will be transferred to the 
auxiliary inventory.   
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D. APPLICATION OF MARKOV-CHAIN MODELS FOR THE PERIOD 
2011–2015 
After classes/cohorts of officers have been matched with the required years of 
service in every pay grade in accordance with ordinance 167/A/24.9.2010, Markov 
models can be applied.  
To facilitate the understanding of Markov-model application, classes/cohorts are 
renamed, as shown in Table 28. 
Table 28.   Renamed classes/cohorts. Sizes of renamed classes/cohorts (2011) 
 
O1 to O6 corresponds to the pay grades as shown in Table 28. The figures that 
follow show the year of service in each pay grade. In other words, an O4-4 officer is one 
who has the pay grade of O4 and is in the fourth year of service in this specific pay grade.  
1. Transition Probabilities 
In order to apply Markov-chain models, the HN establishes fixed transition 
probabilities. For the thesis, simulated transition probabilities are presented, as follows. 
a. Transition Probabilities of O1s 
Officers with the pay grade of O1 have only two states, to continue in the 
same pay grade for one more year or be promoted to the next higher rank (O2-1). 
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However, according to ordinance 167/A/24.9.2010, only O1-4s can be promoted to the 
pay grade of O2-1. Transition probabilities for O1s are presented in Table 29. 
Table 29.   Transition probabilities of O1s (2011–2015) 
 
b. Transition Probabilities of O2s  
The transition probabilities of O2s follow exactly the same pattern as with 
O1s. In other words, every officer continues in the same pay grade for one more year, and 
only those at the sixth year of service are promoted to the next higher rank (O3-1). 
Transition probabilities of O2s are shown in Table 30. 
Table 30.   Transition probabilities of O2s (2011–2015)  
O2-1 O2-2 O2-3 O2-4 O2-5 O2-6 promotion
O2-1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
O2-2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
O2-3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
O2-4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
O2-5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
O2-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  
c. Transition Probabilities of O3s 
At this pay grade, an additional state is present: transfer to the auxiliary 
inventory of officers. Officers who are transferred are those with the lowest scores in job 
performance. The transition probabilities of O3s are presented in Table 31.  
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Table 31.   Transition probabilities of O3s (2011–2015) 
O3-1 O3-2 O3-3 O3-4 O3-5 O3-6 promotion auxiliary
O3-1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O3-2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
O3-3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
O3-4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
O3-5 0 0 0 0 0 0.85 0.12 0.03
O3-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.95 0.05  
Table 31 shows that early promotion is present at this pay grade. In 
addition to those officers at the sixth year of service, officers at the fifth year of service 
may also be promoted to the next higher rank (O4-1). 
d. Transition Probabilities of O4s  
As with O3s, officers at the pay grade of O4 have three states. The 
transition probabilities are shown in Table 32. 
Table 32.   Transition Probabilities of O4s (2011–2015)   
O4-1 O4-2 O4-3 O4-4 O4-5 O4-6 promotion auxiliary
O4-1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O4-2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
O4-3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
O4-4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
O4-5 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1
O4-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0.1  
Again, as with O3s, early promotion is also present in this pay grade. 
Officers in the fifth year of service may be promoted to next higher rank (O5-1). 
e. Transition Probabilities of O5s 
Again, there are three states in this pay grade. The transition probabilities 
are shown in Table 33. 
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Table 33.   Transition probabilities of O5s (2011–2015) 
O5-1 O5-2 O5-3 O5-4 O5-5 O5-6 promotion auxiliary
O5-1 0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
O5-2 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0.1
O5-3 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0.2
O5-4 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0.2
O5-5 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.15 0.1
O5-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.2  
Officers in the fifth year of service may be promoted to the next higher 
rank (O6-1) as shown in Table 33. 
f. Transition Probabilities of O6s 
Officers of this pay grade may continue for one more year in the same pay 
grade, be promoted to flag officers, or be transferred to the auxiliary inventory. Table 34 
shows the transition probabilities of O6s. 
Table 34.   Transition Probabilities of O6s (2011–2015)   
O6-1 O6-2 O6-3 O6-4 promotion auxiliary
O6-1 0 0.8 0 0 0 0.2
O6-2 0 0 0.75 0 0 0.25
O6-3 0 0 0 0.8 0.1 0.1
O6-4 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.6  
The process of early promotion is also present at this pay grade. 
The states and transition probabilities of the pay grades of O3, O4, O5, 
and O6 are shown in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.   States–transition probabilities for O3s, O4s, O5s and O6s   
2. Application of Markov-Chain Models  
Given the steady transition probabilities of Tables 29 to 34, Markov models are 
applied. The model is displayed in the Appendix B.  
E. RESULTS OF THE APPLICATION OF MARKOV-CHAIN MODELS IN 
THE HELLENIC NAVY’S WAR AND AUXILIARY INVENTORY  
1. Number of Officer Accessions 
The number of accessions in the first pay grade (O1-1) required to correct the 
deficiencies at the end of the fifth year (2015) is shown in Table 35.   
Table 35.   Accessions in the first year of service of the first pay grade (O1-1)  
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2. Distribution of Officers in 2015 
The distribution of war officers in every pay grade at the end of the year 2015 and 
the corresponding billets are shown in Table 36. 
Table 36.   Final distribution of war officers (2015) in every pay grade with corresponding 
billets  
Pay Grades 
Distribution O1-4 O2-6 O3-6 O4-6 O5-6 O6-4
2015 61 36 40 6 25 4
O1-3 O2-5 O3-5 O4-5 O5-5 O6-3
59 16 48 15 3 15
O1-2 O2-4 O3-4 O4-4 O5-4 O6-2
53 16 61 37 47 23
O1-1 O2-3 O3-3 O4-3 O5-3 O6-1
57 24 50 61 28 24
O2-2 O3-2 O4-2 O5-2
18 47 49 38
O2-1 O3-1 O4-1 O5-1
60 38 36 54
total num 230 170 284 204 195 66
400
War Inventory (total) total 1149
Billets 400 284 217 198 79
Billets (total) total 1178
Auxiliary  Inventory total 233  
Given the transition probabilities, Table 36 shows that the sum of officers with the 
pay grade of O1 and O2 and officers with the pay grade of O3  are equal to the number of 
corresponding billets. The number of officers of the forth pay grade (O4) is fewer than 
the billets. However, the gap of thirteen officers can be filled by transferring thirteen top 
performers (O4s) from the auxiliary to war inventory. In the fifth pay grade, there is a 
minor difference of three officers between the distribution and the corresponding billets. 
This gap can be filled by retrieving three top performers (O5s) from the auxiliary 
inventory. As with O4s, there are fewer officers of the sixth pay grade than corresponding 
billets. This deficiency can be resolved by transferring thirteen officers of the auxiliary 
inventory who have exhibited high levels of job performance. Finally, retrieving top 
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performers of the auxiliary inventory may correct deficiencies concerning the distribution 
of officers in every pay grade. Simultaneously, the total inventory may be kept fixed.   
The application of a Markov-chain model for the period 2011 to 2015, in which 
the HN desires to correct deficiencies and adjust its distribution of officers to designated 
billets, is effective. Deficiencies have been significantly limited. However, the auxiliary 
inventory counts 233 officers whose scores in job performance are lower than war 
officers. This pool of officers may be used to complement the war inventory to correct its 
deficiencies wherever necessary. Top performers of the auxiliary inventory may be 
transferred to war inventory to fill, not only gaps in any pay grade (O3 and above), but 
also to correct any deficiencies regarding the total war inventory.  Thus, the auxiliary 
inventory essentially complements the war inventory, keeping it always fixed.      
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V. SUMMARY—CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Hellas is currently suffering from a financial crisis because of over-lending which  
led to the 2009 recession. The recession continues to plague the nation, and remedies to 
avoid a countrywide collapse are being examined in governmental, private, and public 
sectors. The HMoD is striving to reduce costs while maintaining operational readiness. 
One government level being examined is retirement legislation for military personnel. 
Specifically, changes to the required length of service in each pay grade are being 
examined in accordance with Presidency of the Hellenic Republic ordinance 
167/A/24.9.2010.  
The Hellenic navy faces two notable challenges. Firstly, it is adjusting the years 
of service in each pay grade in accordance with ordinance 167/Α/24.9.2010. Secondly, 
the HN is examining differences between force structure and officer inventory in the next 
five years.  
Under these conditions that the crisis has caused, existing policies do not support 
the proposed legislation. This research models different methods for the HN to establish 
new policy to successfully implement Hellenic Republic legislation, ordinance 
167/A/24.9.2010.    
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions  
a. Which Promotion Policies Meet Required Officer Accessions so 
that Only Top Performers Track to War Officer Inventory? 
Conclusions: 
The United States Navy, through early promotion recommendations, 
distinguishes between top and average performers among its officers. Currently the HN 
requires 35 years of service and bases promotions on specific years of service at each pay 
grade. All officers who stay 35 years will receive a full pension. 
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Recommendation: 
• Have the Department of personnel divide the officer inventory into two officer 
tracks, war and auxiliary. The war track would include top performing officers 
as identified through the fitness report system. The second track includes 
officers whose fitness performance do not meet current war inventory fitness 
report criteria. Top performers, apart from receiving a full pension at the end 
of their careers, will also have the opportunity to promote to flag officers, 
unlike officers that remain in the auxiliary inventory. 
• The HN should provide early promotion opportunities for top performers in 
pay grades O3 and above. This will facilitate the application of ordinance 
167/Α/24.9.2010, with respect to the required years of service in each pay 
grade. Early promotion would be based on fitness report scores.  
b. Can Components such as Experience, Ability (Performance), 
Motivation, and Attainment of Advanced Degrees Reliably 
Convert Performance into a Metric with a Numerical Value? 
Conclusions: 
The majority of the criteria that identify top perfomers currently exist in 
the HN fitness reporting system. In order to further clarify top performers in the future, 
some identifiers must be added. The critical criteria that need to be clarified are 
experience, ability (performance), motivation, and attainment of advanced degrees.  
Experience has traditionally been used as a primary factor in evaluating 
job performance, but it cannot alone control for the level of an officer’s job performance. 
Experience needs to be combined with various levels of education in order to be a 
component of evaluation. Ability, from the performance perspective, is a highly valued 
component of fitness reports at almost every pay grade. Higher ranks in a military chain 
of command require an advanced level of general ability, because these officers are 
required to make decisions under various conditions of uncertainty. These decisions are 
often made in stressful and hazardous conditions unknown to the average citizen. 
Motivation has proven to be the dominant behavior that shapes an individual’s ability to 
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accomplish unforeseen tasks. Finally, while graduate studies do not necessarily make 
officers experts, officers who possess or who are willing to attain an advanced degree 
show characteristics of persistence and ambition. These persistent and ambitious 
individuals are more motivated and apt to accomplish assigned tasks despite obstacles 
and they deserve to receive extra credit in fitness reports.    
Recommendation: 
• HN leadership must re-evaluate the appropriate weighting of the experience 
component in fitness reports. However, starting from the pay grade of O3, the 
assigned weight becomes more critical to officers promotion.  
• The HN needs to examine the weight it places on management qualifications 
which represent ability from a performance persepective. The examination 
needs to occur specifically in the middle and higher pay grades.  
• The HN must incorporate a motivation component in fitness reports from the 
perspective of individual behavior. In other words, when assigning points in 
fitness reports, evaluators should take into account task accomplishment 
regardless the prevailed conditions of the working environment.  
• The HN should include graduate education as an evaluation field in fitness 
reports. Officers who possess an advanced degree must be evaluated 
differently than officers without gradute education.  
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What Practices Should Be Adopted to Turn Fitness Reports into 
an Objective Tool for Promotion Processes? 
Conclusions:  
The HN needs to separate top performers from those with lower 
evaluation scores. The solution is to calculate the average grade of fitness reports of 
every evaluator. Officers with a high level of job performance are considered those with 
scores above the average grade of their evaluator, whereas poor performers are those 
whose scores are below. Thus, job performance is expressed as the difference between 
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the score of an officer’s fitness report and the average grade of the evaluator. This 
concept is very important because it minimizes evaluator’s subjectivity even though 
fitness reports are based on subjective perceptions. However, calculating averages only 
may not be enough. The minimum and maximum grades of every evaluator should also 
be taken into account. It is important because large variations in ranges among evaluators 
may lead to selection errors.  
This calculation will help officers to motivate themselves and improve 
their level of performance. As an overall outcome, it will improve the performance of the 
HN as an entity. Graduation from HNA and  Lieutenant, junior grade and general training 
class seniority is also an indicator of performance in an officers career. 
Recommendation: 
• Develop a mathematical model to normalize the restated ranges so that a 
common ground exists among all evaluators. 
• Establish weights for every field of the fitness report.  
• Graduation from HNA and  Lieutenant, junior grade and general training class 
seniority is an indicator of performance in an officers career and must be 
added to the fitness reporting system. 
b. How Can War and Auxiliary Inventories Be Estimated Over Five 
Years 
Conclusions: 
Markov-chain models have estimated the HN war and auxiliary 
inventories. The model showed that deficiencies in war inventory have been significantly 
reduced or will be equal to the requirements of ordinance 167/A/24.9.2010 by the end of 
2015. Nonetheless, another inventory (auxiliary) consisting of 233 officers with low job 
performance scores has been created. Additionally the model showed that inflation in the 





Use top performers from the auxiliary to compensate for shortfalls in  the 
war inventory as necessary.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The HN should conduct research on how to improve performance of top 
performing auxiliary-officers. The research should examine how well these auxiliary 
officers perform in the war inventory.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 37.   Health/body category and its subsets     
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Table 38.   Experience level category and subsets 
Category (b) Military 
characteristics 
Five-factor model 
of personality  
MARS model  Measurement 
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Table 39.   Mentality level category and its subsets 
Category (c) Military 
characteristics 
Five-Factor model 
of personality  
MARS model  Measurement 









































Table 40.   Personal core values/ courage category and its subsets  
Category (d) Military 
characteristics 
Five-Factor model 
of personality  
MARS model  Measurement 
Personal core 
values/courage 
    
Subsets  
(d1)Courage in 
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Table 41.   Management qualifications category and its subsets 
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Table 42.   Professional proficiency category and its subsets 
Category (f) Military 
characteristics 
Five-Factor model 
of personality  
MARS model  Measurement 
Professional 
proficiency. 
    
Subsets     
(f1)Expert 
knowledge 























































































Table 43.   Naval proficiency and experience category and its subsets 
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Table 44.   Class seniority (graduation from HNA) category  










- •Conscientiousness •Ability 
•Motivation 
10, 8, 6, 4, 2 
Table 45.   Class Seniority (graduation from lieutenant, junior grade and general training) 
category  
Category (j) Military 
characteristics 
Five-Factor model 
of personality  















10, 8, 6, 4, 2 
Table 46.   Possession of graduate studies certificate 
Category (k) Military 
characteristics 
Five-Factor model 
of personality  
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